The Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), including the ICP, MWS, WI= SE, IAF, Elehssan, AMCN and others known and unknown, constituted an “enterprise” (hereinafter referred to as the "PIJ Enterprise"), as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 1961= (4); that is, a group of individuals and entities associated in fact which engag= ed in, and the activities of which affected, interstate and foreign commerce.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The enterprise constituted an ongo= ing organization whose members functioned as a continuing unit for a common pur= pose of achieving the objects of the enterprise.

The Racketeer= ing Conspiracy Violation

From = in or about 1984, the exact date being unknown to the grand jury, and continuing until in or about the date of this Superseding Indictment, in the Middle District of Florida and elsewhere,

SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN,

a/k/a “Amin,"

a/k/a “The Secretary,"

a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH,

a/k/a “Ramadan Abdullah,"=

a/k/a “Rashad,"

a/k/a “Mohamad El-Fatih,"=

a/k/a “Mahmoud,"

a/k/a “Radwan,"

a/k/a "Al-Shaer,"

a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI,

a/k/a “Ahmed,"

a/k/a “Abu Obaida,"

and

MAZEN AL-NAJJAR,

multiple ac= ts involving murder, in violation of Florida Statutes 782.04; 777.04(3); =

multiple ac= ts involving extortion in violation of Florida Statutes 836.05, 777.011 and 777.04;

acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2) and (h) [money laundering];

acts indict= able under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952 [interstate or foreign tra= vel or transportation and use of any facilities in interstate or foreign commer= ce with the intent to promote and carry on an unlawful activity];

acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 956 [conspiracy to k= ill, kidnap, maim or injure persons in a foreign country];

acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B [providing material support or resources to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations= ];

acts indict= able under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546 [fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents]; and

acts indictable under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503 [obstruction of justice].

It was further part of the conspiracy that each defendant agreed that a conspirator would commit at least two acts of racketeering in the conduct of the affair= s of the enterprise.

Means and Met= hods of the Conspiracy

The enterprise members would and did secretly establish cells or sections of the PIJ in different countrie= s, and in the United States utilized the structure, facilities and academic environment of USF to conceal the activities of the PIJ.<= /p>

The enterprise members would and did, by verbal and written communications, maliciously threaten injury to persons, namely, the inhabitants of the Stat= e of Israel and individuals and entities owning land in the State of Israel, with the intent thereby to obtain from such persons, certain property, namely, t= he physical land located within the State of Israel; such verbal and written communications would and

The enemy forcibly took our land and the Jihad will continue until the complete liberation of our country, from the river to the sea;

Every Jew o= n the land of Palestine will be a target to our bullets and daggers, and without mercy;

It is= a call for a holy Jihad, to liberate and to cleanse the entire Palestinian la= nds from the filth of the Zionist criminals;

Either the Zionists leave Palestine, or we will make it a graveyard for all of them.

Our g= oal is the complete elimination of the Zionist existence from our holy land;<= /o:p>

We will chase the Zionists to any place we can get them to liberate our land; Palestine is ours and not theirs; there is nothing in front of the Zionists= but to leave our holy land;

The existen= ce of any Zionist on Palestinian land, all of Palestine, from the river to the se= a, will be the target of our weapons;

The a= ttack at Beit Lid Junction was to avenge our people at the town of Khodairah, and= on all Palestinian land that Rabin’s gangs confiscated from its occupants who lived on it for thousands of years;

We had our right to resist the Zionist enemy in every way and at any time on a= ny spot of our Palestinian land;

We will remain loyal to the martyrs until every inch of our holy Palestine is returned to the Palestinians;

Blood= will flow until the complete liberation of our country Palestine;

The Zionist entity will not enjoy any security or stability as long as the occupation of our land Palestine remains;

It is our duty to resist that occupation of Palestine, occupied since 1948, and raise their occupational costs, so they will compare between occupation and leaving; an= d,

Jihad= is the only way to get back the whole Palestinian holy land, which is a proper= ty of the whole Islamic nation, and nobody has the right to surrender or yield= a span of land.

The enterprise members would and did videotape statements of PIJ members who we= re planning to participate personally in acts of violence to use as a tool to promote the goals of the enterprise, and to increase and further the public perception of the PIJ as a terrorist organization.

The enterprise members would and did make public statements, issue press releas= es and use internet websites to: (a) proclaim and acknowledge that specific acts of violence had been committed = by the PIJ; (b) threaten future acts of violence if demands of the PIJ were not met; (c) promote and foster terrorism; and (d) increase the prestige and standing of the PIJ amongst terrorist organizations.

The enterprise members would and did actively solicit and raise monies and funds and support for the PIJ and PIJ goals in various ways, including, but not limited to, the following methods:

conducting = and attending fund-raising conferences and seminars;

inviting kn= own terrorists from outside the United States to speak at such conferences and seminars;

trave= ling within the United States and to places outside the United States;

sending let= ters and other documents requesting funds to individuals and countries in the Mi= ddle East and elsewhere;

utili= zing the Internet computer facilities to solicit funds and publish and catalog a= cts of violence committed by the PIJ;

advocating orally and in writing death to Israel and its supporters;

writing and= /or disseminating articles concerning the PIJ; and

diver= ting funds received by ICP, MWS and AMCN which were purportedly intended for charitable purposes.

The enterprise members would and did draft and/or hold wills and last testaments for PIJ members who would and did die while committing acts of violence aga= inst the inhabitants of Israel, and would and did otherwise generate, distribute= and maintain lists of PIJ "martyrs" and "detainees."

The enterprise members would and did transfer monies and funds by wire transfer= and otherwise between states in the United States, from locations within the Un= ited States to places outside of the United States, and from places outside of t= he United States to places within the United States, such transfers designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, the location, the ownership, or the control of the monies and funds, all for the purpose of promoting PIJ activities and objectives, including paying compensation to t= he families of PIJ “martyrs” and "detainees."=

The enterprise members would and did perform management functions including but not limited to: (a) determining the organizational structure of the PIJ; (b) determining the goals, strategies and policies of= the PIJ; (c) administering the financial affairs of the PIJ; (d) ordering and conducting an accounting of all PIJ monies and property, real and personal, held by enterprise members; (e) settling disagreements between and amongst members of the PIJ and between PIJ and other terrorist organizations; and (= f) addressing and resolving security concerns of the PIJ enterprise and its members.

The enterprise members would and did work and associate with other terrorist organizations, including, among others, HAMAS and Hizballah, to accomplish = acts of violence that were mutually beneficial.

The enterprise members would and did utilize instrumentalities and facilities of interstate and foreign commerce, including telephones, telephone facsimiles, private commercial carriers, computers, mail, and wire facilities, to communicate and promote and conduct the affairs of the enterprise.

The enterprise members would and did arrange to have enterprise members in the United States serve as communication facilitators to assist enterprise memb= ers in Gaza and the West Bank to communicate with other enterprise members loca= ted in Syria and other countries.

The enterprise members would and did provide assistance to terrorists, themselv= es, and other enterprise members by making and causing others to make false, mi= sleading and evasive statements, and knowingly submitting, and causing others to sub= mit false, misleading and evasive documents and writings, to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or in official proceedings, on behalf of terrorists, themselves, or other enterpr= ise members, to enable them to enter, remain and work in the United States, and= to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice.

The enterprise members would and did utilize codes in conversations and communi= ques to conceal and disguise the enterprise’s true activities and identiti= es of members.

The enterprise members, while concealing their association with the PIJ, wou= ld and did seek to obtain support from influential individuals in the United State= s, under the guise of promoting and protecting Arab rights. The enterprise members would and did make false statements and misrepresent facts to representatives of the medi= a to promote the goals of the PIJ.

The enterprise members would and did misrepresent, conceal, and hide, and cause= to be misrepresented, concealed, and hidden, the purpose of acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy.

&= nbsp; &nbs= p; &= nbsp; &nbs= p; &= nbsp; E. Overt Acts In furtherance of the conspiracy and to accomplish the objects of the conspira= cy, the defendants and their co-conspirators committed, among others, the follo= wing Overt Acts, within the Middle District of Florida and elsewhere, which are described in substance below:

On or about December 22, 1988, in = St. Louis, Missouri, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR attended the first = ICP Conference. Funds were solici= ted and raised for the PIJ and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR attempted= to recruit one or more individuals to join the PIJ.&n= bsp; (1)

On or about May 3, 1989, Nidal Zal= loum, a co-conspirator associated with the PIJ, carried out a knife attack on a m= ain street in Jerusalem, killing two elderly men and wounding several other peo= ple.

On or about July 7, 1989, a co-conspirator associated with the PIJ murdered approximately fourteen peop= le and injured several others in an attack on a bus en route from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem in Israel. Two Unit= ed States citizens, Pella and Paul Fingersh, were passengers on the bus and we= re injured. A United States citizen, Rita Levine, was killed.

On or about December 17, 1989, ABD= AL AZIZ AWDA spoke at an ICP event and said that Israel responded to one langu= age, the language of violence, death, blood and killing, and that would be the language their Jihad was going to adopt. (2)

(5) ABD AL AZIZ AWDA was introduced as= the Imam of the Al-Qassam Mosque in the Gaza Strip and the spiritual leader of = the PIJ. In a question and answer session during the conference, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI told a young man in the audience to meet him outside the conference if he wanted to discuss how weapons reached the Territories. During that same session, Unindicted Co-Conspirator One said that terrorism and terrorism alone was the path to liberation, and ABD AL AZIZ A= WDA responded by telling him that they refused to consider their jihad to be eq= ual to terrorism. (3)<= /span>

(6) (4)

(7) Unindicted Co-Conspirator One said= the PIJ was referred to as the ICP for security reasons. Unindicted Co-Conspirator One also= urged those in attendance to donate to the PIJ in memory of Nidal Zalloum, who stabbed four Jews, and the mujahid who took the bus and killed more than tw= enty Jews. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIA= N then spoke, praised the Intifada, and praised individuals who had escaped from a prison in 1987 with the help of the PIJ and then killed many people. (This terrorist act is also referr= ed to as the Battle of Al-Shujaiya.) SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN further mentioned the Gulf War and questioned why they stopped the protests against it. He then said they should continue the protests, continue to damn America, continue to damn Israel, and continue to damn the allies of America and Israel until death.&= nbsp; SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN also said that going to the Holy Land for Muslims= was not a matter of going for a visit or tourism; rather, it was a matter of go= ing for Jihad. (5)

On or about April 7, 1991, in Clev= eland, Ohio, Unindicted Co-Conspirator One spoke after the speech of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. Unindicted Co-Consp= irator One requested that those people attending donate money and said the money w= as going to the PIJ and the Islamic Jihad movement would continue to spread fr= om village to village. He then s= aid that they hoped there would be a permanent ICP fund in Cleveland, Ohio for anyone who wished to donate to the PIJ.&nb= sp; (6)

On or about September 29, 1991, in Chicago, Illinois, GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, ABD AL AZIZ AW= DA and Unindicted Co-Conspirator One attended a celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Al-Shujaiya (the start of the first Intifada). GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT was introduced as the representative of the ICP in Chicago, Illinois. He said that there = was no logic but the logic of Jihad -- the way to success was clear, the rifles mu= st be raised in one direction, the chest of the enemy. He then advised the crowd that the= enemy was in the desert of Kuwait and that coalition forces were going to kill th= eir babies in Iraq. Further, GHAS= SAN ZAYED BALLUT criticized Israel for deporting Dr. Fathi Shiqaqi, and describ= ed him as a Muslim thinker and freedom fighter. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said Jews were damned; that Allah had made them monkeys and swine and damned them in this world and in the afterworld. = (7)

On or about October 11, 1991, GHAS= SAN ZAYED BALLUT concealed, in the section of an INS document requiring applica= nts to disclose memberships and organizations to which the applicant belonged, = that he was a member of the PIJ and the ICP in the Chicago, Illinois area. (8)

On or about December 9, 1991, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN purchased two official checks totaling $52,000 payable to GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT from funds drawn on the joint account belonging to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB (hereinafter referred to as the “Al-Arian/Al-Khatib account”) at NCNB Bank in Tampa, Florida.

On or about December 27, 1991, in Chicago, Illinois, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, Omar Abdel Rahman (“The Blind Sheik”), ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT attended the Fourth Annual ICP Conference. ABD AL AZIZ AWDA advised the participants at the conference to

(10)

On or about January 8, 1992, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR wrote and cashed a $15,015 check drawn on the WISE account at NCNB Bank. On or about January 8, = 1992, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR used the proceeds to purchase a $15,015 official check at N= CNB and then used that check to purchase a $15,000 wire transfer at Southeast B= ank which was sent to an account at National Westminster Bank in England belong= ing to BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI.

On or about February 14, 1992, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ entered an Israeli military camp in= the vicinity of the West Bank near Israel and murdered three people. Four of the individuals who partic= ipated in the attack were caught and proclaimed they were members of the PIJ. They were: Ibrahim Hassan Agbarya, Muhamid Sa= ed Agbarya, Yiche Mustafa Agbarya and Muhamad Taufik Suleiman. (11)

On or about February 19, 1992, unindicted co-conspirators Khaled Muhammed Hassan, Nizar Mahmoud, Abdel Kam= el Daher created their wills in anticipation of committing a suicide attack on behalf of the PIJ. (12)<= /o:p>

On or about February 24, 1992, MAZ= EN AL-NAJJAR caused a $11,250 check to be written which was drawn on an account belonging to Mohammed Elnaggar, payable to GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT.=

On or about April 6, 1992, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ, including Nizar Mahmoud, Abdel Kamel Daher and Khaled Muhammed Hassan,

(13)

On or about April 27, 1992, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR modified the comput= er file at WISE/ICP which contained the wills of Nizar Mahmoud, Abdel Kamel Da= her and Khaled Muhammed Hassan. (= 14)

On or about August 30, 1992, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $10,000 check drawn on the ICP account at First Union Nati= onal Bank, payable to IAF.

On or about September 13, 1992, SA= MI AMIN AL-ARIAN swore in a Petition For Non-Immigrant Workers, filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI would be employed by WISE as Research Director. (15)

On September 15, 1992, a co-conspi= rator wire transferred $99,990.00 from Arab Bank in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirat= es to the Federal Credit Union account of MAZEN AL-NAJJAR at USF. (B) On or about September 18, 1992, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR wrote a check in the amount of $99,500.00 from his USF Federal Credit Union account to his accou= nt at Barnett Bank. (C) On September 29, 1992, MAZEN AL-NA= JJAR transferred $98,500.00 from h= is bank account at Barnett Bank to his Barnett Securities account. (16)(A); (16)(B); (16)(C)

On or about December 25, 1992, in Chicago, Illinois, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and SAMEEH = TAHA HAMMOUDEH attended the Fifth Annual ICP Conference. (B) RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH spoke and said the enemies were the United States, the Zionists and the Arab governments. He said that Muslims should not be defensive or apologize against charges including charges of terrorism, that Jihad required Muslims to terrorize, devastate, humiliate and degrade enemi= es because they were enemies of Allah and that the Koran instructed Muslims to fight and kill those people. (17)(A); (17)(B)

On or about March 3, 1993, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN wrote a $12,040 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to SAMEEH = TAHA HAMMOUDEH. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOU= DEH deposited this check into his personal bank account at First Union National Bank in Tampa, Florida, on or about March 9, 1993. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH then wrote a $12,040 check drawn on his personal bank account, payable to Khalil Shikaki, which was deposited on March 10, 1993 into Khalil Shikaki's personal bank account at Nationsbank in Tampa, Florida.

On or about May 26, 1993, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $6,863 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to SAMEEH T= AHA HAMMOUDEH. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOU= DEH deposited this check into his personal bank account at First Union National Bank in Tampa, Florida. On or= about July 30, 1993, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH wrote a $7,000 check drawn on his pers= onal bank account, payable to WISE, which was deposited into the WISE account at Nationsbank. On or about Augu= st 16, 1993, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR wrote a $5,800 check drawn on the WISE account, payab= le to MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, which was deposited into his personal bank account at Barnett Bank. On or about Aug= ust 16, 1993, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR caused a $5,770 wire transfer to be sent to an account belonging to BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI at the National Westminster = Bank in England.

On or about June 1, 1993, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $5,000.00 check from an account he had at USF Federal Cred= it Union to his NCNB account. (B= ) He then caused four separate wire transfers of $2,000.00 each to Bank Leumi in Tel Aviv, Israel. (18)(A); (18)(B)=

On or about June 2, 1993, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $20,000 check drawn on an ICP account at First Union Natio= nal Bank in Tampa, Florida, payable to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH deposited th= is check into his personal bank account at First Union National Bank in Tampa, Florida. On or about June 29,= 1993, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH wrote a $20,000 check drawn on his personal bank acco= unt, payable to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, which was deposited into the Al-Arian/Al-Kha= tib account on or about July 6, 1993, at Nationsbank in Tampa, Florida. On or about July 13, 1993, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN caused a $20,000 bank debit and a corresponding wire transfer to be sent to Mohamed El.

On June 3, 1993, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN caused four wire transfers of $1,944.00 each to be sent from Bank Leumi to accounts at Mercantile Discount Bank in Umm El Fahem, West Bank, in the nam= es of: Zahera Agbarya, Rokayah Agbarya, Mostafa Agbarya and Bushra Suleiman, all of whom were spouses or relatives of recently convicted PIJ terrorists serving sentences in Israeli jails for their participation in a terrorist attack on or about February 14, 1992, in which they murdered three Israelis. (19)

On or about June 21, 1993, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN submitted a visa petition to INS for MAZEN AL-NAJJAR to remain in = the United States and work at WISE. (20)

On or about September 8, 1993, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN executed a Petition for a Non-Immigrant Worker with the INS on beh= alf of "Ramadan A.M. Shallah." (21)

On or about December 30, 1993, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN filed a false application with INS for naturalization to become a United States citizen. (22)

On or about January 9, 1994, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with a male about several topics concerning the PIJ: (a) the m= ale indicated that during his recent trip to the Territory, he was unable to see Muhammad Al-Hindy because Hindy was in custody, and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN aske= d if that was the result of the PIJ terror attack of December 13, 1993 by Anwar Abdel Aziz Aziz; (b) the male said the PIJ financial condition was bad in t= he Territory and that the PIJ regretted that it did not exploit the situation which had existed in 1987, and if they had the PIJ would have become the dominant organization; (c) the male said the PIJ members had a good plan to have members active underground and above ground; (d) SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN sa= id the PIJ had previously determined they could not pay students' fees at a university; and (e) SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB= had not been removed from the PIJ and was not moving to Iran. (23)

On or about January 11, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from a co-conspirator which addressed the sta= tus of the PIJ in the Territories and indicated that the old financial rules of= the PIJ would continue to be followed until SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN got other PIJ members together and changed them. (24)

On or about January 13, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi in Syria requesting that Fathi Shiqaqi invalidate the current PIJ financial rules and settle the financial difficulties of the PIJ by having the Shura Council meet regularly by phone= . SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN also emphasized= to Fathi Shiqaqi that the PIJ members overseas were having financial difficulties. (25)=

On or about January 16, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB = in which they discussed: (a) Fat= hi Shiqaqi; (b) a meeting held in Beirut, Lebanon; (c) infighting among PIJ members; (d) the third party (Iran) which participated in the meetings; and= (e) as a consequence of the PIJ financial situation, whether “The Center” (WISE) at USF would be closed. When SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN inquired w= hy "The Center" would be closed, MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB indicated that he convinced the "third party" and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA not to authorize payments to Fathi Shiqaqi when he requested money. (26)

On or about January 16, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which discussed the role of the PIJ finance committee in the distribution of funds and the relationship= of the PIJ with the Palestinian Authority.&nb= sp; (28)

On or about January 17, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to PIJ members which suggested that the PIJ creat= e an organization which would not have a stated terror agenda but would covertly work with the PIJ in the Territories. (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in whi= ch they referred to a facsimile from earlier that day. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he had dis= cussed the facsimile with other PIJ leaders and members and decided the PIJ did not need to create a political organization to duplicate the efforts of HAMAS.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> (27)(A); (27)(B)=

On or about January 17, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN transmitted a facsimile by BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, which discus= sed the position of the PIJ with respect to Israel, the Palestinian Authority a= nd HAMAS. (B) On the following day, SAMI AMIN AL= -ARIAN sent a facsimile which indicated that MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN did not feel the PIJ needed an official spokesperson in the Territories. (29)(A); (29)(B)=

On or about January 22, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB,= who was overseas, in which MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB indicated that the proposal to have the PIJ expand into non-violent activities could not be done. They also discussed the financial split within the PIJ and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's attempt to round up support for a reorganization of the PIJ.&n= bsp; (33)

On or about January 22, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, who was overse= as, in which they discussed the financial situation within the PIJ and the accounting for PIJ money which had been used to purchase homes. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN expressed conce= rn about a PIJ split because he, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI= had many years invested in the PIJ. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said that, if needed, he could arrange for the distribution of monies within the Territories. ABD AL AZIZ AWDA said he had recen= tly spoken with Fathi Shiqaqi about the PIJ paying salaries to RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN= then stated that Fathi Shiqaqi had sent RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH $50,000.00 in 1993. They also agreed the PIJ could afford to pay 400 martyrs' families $120.00 per month. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN then discussed = the whereabouts of nearly $2,000,000 in missing PIJ money. Finally, they discussed RAMADAN AB= DULLAH SHALLAH's statement that he (RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH) would be the best pe= rson to be in charge of PIJ finances. (31)

On or about January 22, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with BASH= IR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who was in England, in which they discussed the dispute within the PIJ over money and the danger that the PIJ would splinter. (32)

On or about January 22, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB,= who was overseas, in which they discussed the possible splitting of the PIJ. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN emphasized that= the financial situation needed to be taken care of for the sake of the PIJ memb= ers in the United States. (30)

On or about January 22, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was in Syria, in which they discussed the PIJ financial crisis= and the concerns of PIJ members including SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, AND MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi wh= ich urged respect for the PIJ Shura Council while they debated the approval of = the financial reforms proposed by SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. (30.1); (34)

On or about January 23, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in England which discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's proposed financial reform project for the PI= J, which proposed: (a) the creation of a three-person committee of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, MAZEN AL- NAJJAR, and Fathi Shiqaqi to disburse all PIJ funds and conduct a general accounting of all PIJ assets within two months; (b) weekly meetings of the Shura Council in Syria which would send its minutes abroad; (c) conference calls with PIJ leaders throug= hout the world to vote when necessary; (d) a general conference of the PIJ membership to be held during the summer of 1994; and (e) open discussion of= all aspects of PIJ business among the PIJ members at the conference.= &nb= sp; (B) Later th= at day, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN sent this facsimile to the Middle East. (35)(A); (35)(B)=

On or about January 23, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in Eng= land in which they discussed: (a) = that Fathi Shiqaqi did not want MAZEN AL-NAJJAR on the PIJ finance committee; (b) that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH did not want to be on the finance committee; = (c) that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN did not want the burden of the PIJ finance committe= e if the only other member was Fathi Shiqaqi; and (d) that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN did not want MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB on the finance committee. They also stated that Fathi Shiqaq= i, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB owned several homes which belonged to the PIJ. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN indicated that his initial efforts would be to account for the PIJ money in these homes. SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN questioned BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI whether the PIJ had stores of gold and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI replied that they did not; however, they= had previously brought gold bullion into Jordan. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI disagreed over the extent to which Iran needed to be notified= of the results of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial audit of the PIJ. Finally, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said it would take three to four weeks to make the finance committee operational. (36)

On or about January 24, 1994, ABD = AL AZIZ AWDA called Unindicted Co-Conspirator Two at SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's home, who then arranged a three-way call with SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, who was overseas= , and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN discussed several subjects: (a) ABD AL AZIZ AWDA's general sup= port for SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's proposed financial reforms; (b) ABD AL AZIZ AWDA's recommendation to create a provisional command of five men in place of the Shura Council to manage the PIJ and its financial operations until a general conference was convened; (c) ABD AL AZIZ AWDA's suggestion that the provisi= onal command members include Fathi Shiqaqi, Abu Tariq Ziyad, MUHAMMED TASIR HASS= AN AL-KHATIB, Sheik Sayyed and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN disagreed with = ABD AL AZIZ AWDA's suggestion because Sheik Sayyed was not a member of the Shura Council. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN recommended, instead, that Sheik Sayyed be replaced by BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI. Moreover, SAMI AMIN AL-= ARIAN said he was not in favor of replacing the Shura Council with the command committee unless the existing Shura Council agreed. Finally, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA said the Iranians had intervened in the PIJ because of its financial difficulties. (37)

On or about January 25, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to PIJ members requesting that the PIJ members vo= te “yes," “no," or “abstain from voting” regarding his three-part financial reform proposal. (B) On the same day, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile at his home from RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH indicating that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had abstained from voting on SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial reform proposal. (38)(A); (38)(B)=

On or about January 27, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Abu Al-Abed which said that Abu Al-Abed, Issam, Hamed and Abu Tariq all supported SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial ref= orm proposal. They also reaffirmed their support for MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's participation on the finance committee. (39)

On or about January 27, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile which proposed to end the bickering within the PIJ that had evolved because of the Beirut meeting. The facsimile mentioned disagreeme= nts within the PIJ and how they had affected the situation within the Territories. The facsimile fu= rther directed that all the PIJ monies were to be turned over to the Treasurer of= the PIJ, MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB, who would then transfer the money to = an account in the names of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and Fathi Shiqaqi. (40)

On or about January 27, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in whi= ch SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN advised that his PIJ financial proposal had been approved. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMME= D NAFI suggested and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN agreed to send an announcement to MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB and to PIJ members in Syria to inform them of the re= sult and request that Fathi Shiqaqi organize a summer meeting. (40.1)

On or about January 30, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH regardi= ng his attempt to make an overseas telephone call to ABD AL AZIZ AWDA in Syria. (40.4)

On or about January 30, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with the Treasurer of the PIJ, MUHAMM= ED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB, who was in Syria, in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial reform proposal. MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB indicated he would not support SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial reform proposal and said he had previously transferred $10,000,000.00 to Fathi Shiqaqi. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN told MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB not to use numbers or names over the telephone. (41)

On or about January 31, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with= BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI who was in England, in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial reform proposal. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI said MUH= AMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB had abstained from voting and others in the “North” did not like it. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he wanted to centralize control of all PIJ f= unds into a committee. They agreed= that

(42)

On February 3, 1994, co-conspirato= rs caused a facsimile to be sent from WISE to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN indicating: (a) that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's fina= ncial reform proposal had carried by a vote of eight to two; (b) that the previous agreement made in Beirut was now annulled; (c) that Iran was informed of the new arrangements; (d) that within three weeks, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN would open accounts for PIJ funds; (e) that MAZEN AL-NAJJAR would send financial detai= ls within two weeks; (f) that all proposed budgets for 1994 must be sent to the committee within a month; (g) that there was to be an accounting of all PIJ= funds and properties within a month; (h) that Fathi Shiqaqi would hold weekly meetings and send a weekly summary to PIJ members abroad; and (i) that SAMI AMIN AL-= ARIAN would arrange for phone conferences every two weeks for members of the Shura Council to vote and discuss resolutions.&n= bsp; (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile containing an edited version of the facsimile he = had received from WISE the day before. The revised facsimile indicated that it was issued by the “Secretary” of the Shura Council. (43)(A); (43)(B)=

On or about February 4, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, in wh= ich BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI stated he had not yet received the facsimile from SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. SAMI AMIN= AL-ARIAN said he would send it later. = They also discussed individuals who distributed money for the PIJ. (44)

On or about February 7, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Abu Jihad, describing the decision of the PIJ Shura Council to adopt SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's financial reform proposal and declaring an annulment of the Beirut agreement and the three-person committ= ee it had created. (45)

On February 7, 1994, MAZEN AL-NAJJ= AR caused a wire transfer in the amount of $102,872.00 to be sent from Tampa, Florida to MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB, the PIJ Treasurer, at Arab Bank, the Riad Al Sulh Branch, Beirut, Lebanon.&= nbsp; (46)

On or about February 7, 1994, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi about a meeting a PIJ repr= esentative recently attended in Iran regarding PIJ finances. Fathi Shiqaqi related that the PIJ= would not back down from its position. (47)

On February 9, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-= ARIAN received a facsimile addressed to Ziyad Nakhaleh from Abu Jihad. The facsimile addressed the implementation of the new PIJ financial reforms and suggested that they del= ay turning over all PIJ assets to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN for three months. (B) Later that day, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with= RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH in which they discussed the facsimile received earlier that day which recommended a delay in the implementation of the financial reforms proposed by SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN agreed that a tough response was necessary in order to send a clear message to the PIJ members = and Iran. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN agre= ed to send a copy of his response to RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH for comment before disseminating it. (C) Shortly thereafter, SAMI AMIN AL-A= RIAN sent a facsimile to Abu Jihad, which said the Beirut agreement was unconstitutional and there would be no postponement of the new PIJ financial reforms. It also reaffirmed t= hat Iran was a strategic partner of the PIJ and was signed, “The Secretary”. (D) SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN then had a tele= phone conversation with MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, in which they discussed PIJ members who = were attempting to delay the new financial reforms, and that they should be dealt with strongly. (48)(A); (48)(= B); (48)(C); (48)(D)

On or about February 9, 1994,= SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH in which they discussed BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's suggestion that they refra= in from confronting the Iranians and telling them that disbursement of PIJ fun= ds was none of their business. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI wanted the PIJ to save that as a final position. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMME= D NAFI was worried that PIJ members would succumb to Iranian pressure because ever= yone in the PIJ needed money. RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN discussed strategies, one of which = was to borrow $250,000.00 to $500,000.00 from HAMAS for two or three months. (49)

On or about February 10, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB,= who was in Syria. MUHAMMED TASIR = HASSAN AL-KHATIB opposed the new PIJ reforms because they were enacted to help Fat= hi Shiqaqi. (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH discussed= a conversation he recently had with MUHAMMED

(50)(A); (50)(B)=

On or about February 10, 1994, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ kidnapped and murdered Elan Soudri,= a taxi cab driver, in an area of Israel near the Gaza Strip.

On or about February 12, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI who wa= s in England. They discussed: (a) having a general meeting of PIJ representatives; (b) Fathi Shiqaqi; and (c) the problems they were having w= ith Abu Jihad and others who did not support the new PIJ financial changes. (51)

On February 13, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL= -ARIAN received a facsimile from WISE of a newspaper article in which the Prime Minister of Israel accused the PIJ of trying to destroy the Oslo Peace Acco= rd between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The article also reported the rece= nt murder of Elan Soudri by the PIJ. (52)

On or about February 13, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Abu Jihad, who was in Iran, in w= hich they discussed Abu Jihad's rejection of the proposal contained in the facsi= mile he had previously received from SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. Abu Jihad said the PIJ faced severe problems and no one, including SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, had joined him while he = had been working with the Iranians to obtain support for the PIJ. Abu Jihad also said he did not bel= ieve the Shura Council could solve the problems within the PIJ or with Iran. Abu Jihad named MUHAMMED TASIR HAS= SAN AL-KHATIB as one of the problems. Abu Jihad asked SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN what he was doing to retrieve the $350,000.00 from MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he would d= eal with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (53)

On or about February 14, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who w= as in England, in which they discussed the difficulty of obtaining money and whether they should borrow money. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED N= AFI said money was so tight that PIJ members in England felt they would be bett= er off dealing with HAMAS. SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN expressed concern that Fathi Shiqaqi would make his own deal with Iran, and because the financial situation was so desperate, the PIJ should = try to raise money by selling several of the houses they owned. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he would d= irect all PIJ members to surrender all PIJ assets. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI said he should start with Fathi Shiqaqi= and the rest of the membership would follow.&n= bsp; Finally, they discussed whether they had a copy of the signature of MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB so SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN could use it to reope= n a bank account. (54)=

On February 17, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL= -ARIAN sent a facsimile which directed all PIJ members to: (a) count and report all PIJ money= in their possession or in PIJ bank accounts; (b) count all loans to or from the PIJ; (c) report all real estate owned or purchased by the PIJ and state the purchase price and current value; and (d) report this information under oath. (55)<= /p>

On February 17, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL= -ARIAN sent a facsimile addressed to Abu Jihad directing Abu Jihad to respond to t= he orders of the Shura Council. = SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN further advised Abu Jihad that a delegation from the Shura Council would be coming to visit him soon to ensure cooperation. This facsimile was signed “T= he Secretary”. (56)

On February 23, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL= -ARIAN had two telephone conversations with NationsBank in Tampa inquiring about reopening a joint account he previously held with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN falsely stated that MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB wanted to see a copy of= his signature card. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he expected to receive some money i= nto the account; however, when he was told the account could not be reopened, he requested the bank send MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB's signature card to= aid him in opening a new account. (57)

On or about February 23, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who w= as in England. They discussed financial reform in the PIJ and how they should deal with members who oppos= ed the reforms. BASHIR MUSA MOHA= MMED NAFI told SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN that $2,500,000.00 to $3,000,000.00 was the mo= st money the PIJ ever had and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he had never seen that s= um on paper. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN = also mentioned he could not re-open an account he previously had with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (58)

On or about February 26, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Abu Al-Abed, in which they discu= ssed the PIJ financial situation. = Abu Al-Abed suggested that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and another PIJ member travel to = Iran for a meeting. SAMI AMIN AL-A= RIAN replied that he would discuss scheduling with Fathi Shiqaqi. (B) Several days later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received a fax from BASHIR MU= SA MOHAMMED NAFI informing him that Fathi Shiqaqi received an invitation to travel. (59); (59.1)

On or about March 5, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which described the bicker= ing within the PIJ over proposed changes to the financial committee. (60)

On March 6, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARI= AN received a facsimile from RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH which stated that a grou= p of prominent PIJ members was going to tell Fathi Shiqaqi that they respected h= im and would not support changes in the PIJ financial controls until July. (61)

On or about March 6, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN engaged in a telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator= One in which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN described returning from Chicago after raising $53,000.00, $25,000.00 of whi= ch was collected in cash. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN also discussed the organization of a committee to raise funds and = the status of "martyrs" families in the Territories. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and Unindicted Co-Conspirator One spoke about someone returning from a fund-raising trip in the Sudan. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN= and Unindicted Co-Conspirator One also discussed a scheme in which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN would send a portion of the donations collected in Chicago to Unindicted Co-Conspirator One, who would arrange for the donations to be re-donated by a private individual, who would then take the donation as a t= ax deduction of 40%. Later the p= rivate individual would contribute a portion of the fraudulent tax deduction to SA= MI AMIN AL-ARIAN, thereby increasing the overall amount of the donations. Unindicted Co-Conspirator One and =

(62)

On or about March 6, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN wrote a $2,200 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to SAMEEH T= AHA HAMMOUDEH. On or about March = 7, 1994, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH deposited this check into his personal account = at the First Union Bank.

On or about March 9, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB = in which they discussed a March 6, 1994 facsimile regarding a group within the= PIJ that wanted to maintain the status quo for several months. They disagreed about which PIJ mem= bers should be on the financial committee. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said it would be better to go to HAMAS for money = than agree to MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB's proposal. (65)

On or about March 12, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which stated that the PIJ did not want to press financial reforms on its members = at that time. The facsimile dire= cted SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR to travel within a week for a meetin= g of the Shura Council because the Iranians were ready to offer immediate financ= ial assistance. (66)

On or about March 16, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi, addressed to “The Brothers,” which urged them to prepare to travel through Cyprus if necessary. Fathi Shiqaqi also stated that PIJ money was still being deposited into the accounts of ABD AL AZIZ AWDA and Fathi Shiqaqi and this delayed the money reaching the Territories. (B) Approximately two hours after rece= iving the facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN called RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and discussed it. The= y both agreed a PIJ conference was necessary; however, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH desired to wait until their school terms were finished to convene the conference. (68)(= A); (68)(B)

On or about March 20, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN arranged a three-way telephone conference between himself, Muafaq = (who was in the Territories), and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB (who was in Syria). Muafaq told MUHAMMED = TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB he would send, via facsimile, the names of people in the Territories who needed financial support.&= nbsp; SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB discussed pay= ing these people from a PIJ account. They then discussed BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's arrival in the United States and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN stated that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI would n= ot work at “the Center” at USF.&n= bsp; (70)

On or about March 21, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Salem which was addressed to MUHAMMED TA= SIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. The facsimi= le referred to the difficulties of paying money to the families of the martyrs= and detainees and noted the account number and agent at the Cairo Bank in Jordan. (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN re-transmitted the facsimile to MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (71)(A); (71)(B)=

On or about March 22, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, who was in Syr= ia, in which they

(72)

On or about March 27, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN arranged a three-way conversation between Muafaq in the Territories and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB in Syria. They discussed methods of communic= ations and the advantages of bank accounts versus having money hand delivered. MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB to= ld Muafaq to expect $5,000.00, and directed that this money was to be spent on activities, not aid. Later in= the conversation, MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB again reiterated that the fun= ds were for activity and not to give as aid to needy people. (73)

On or about March 27, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB,= who was in Syria, in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's concerns about utilizing his phone for three-way calls.&n= bsp; (74)

On or about April 2, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi stating Fathi Shiqaqi was willing to meet anywhere; however, several other PIJ members would not be a= ble to travel because of problems with their travel documents. (75)

On or about April 3, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI who wa= s in England, in which they discussed the scheduling of a PIJ conference and that one of the participants did not possess the documents to allow him to atten= d at a particular location. BASHIR= MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI indicated that the financial situation at his “Center” in England was very bad and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he would travel through England on the way to the conference. They then discussed the financial = problems of MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI suggested that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN meet with PIJ members in the “North” regarding the salaries of RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and their financial situation. (76)

On or about April 3, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH in which they discussed the upcoming PIJ conference and the problems other PIJ membe= rs would have entering the country. They then discussed disagreements between HAMAS and FATAH. (77)

On or about April 4, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR had a telephone conversation about providing financial assistance to incoming students and the future of WISE and ICP. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN mentioned that = it was possible he might be receiving $50,000.00 for WISE from sources in the Sudan. MAZEN AL-NAJJAR advise= d SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN not to mention that to anyone. (78)

On or about April 4, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL- NAJJAR spoke by telephone about MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's Egyptian passport. They discu= ssed whether MAZEN AL-NAJJAR should tell Egyptian authorities that he lost his passport. (79)

On or about April 6, 1994, coconspirators associated with the PIJ murdered nine persons and injured approximately fifty in a suicide car bombing of a bus in the vicinity of Af= ula, Israel. (80)

On or about April 7, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which suggested a convenient time and place for a PIJ Shura Council meeting.= (80.1)

On or about April 10, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which discussed the difficulties in determining the location of the PIJ Shura Council meeting.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> (80.2)

On or about April 10, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB,= who was in Syria, in which they discussed a date for the PIJ Shura Council meet= ing and the fact that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had not created an agenda for the meeting. (82)

On or about April 10, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, who was in overseas, in which they discussed the proposed Shura Council conference in May. Additionally, ABD AL AZI= Z AWDA said he had helped Fathi Shiqaqi with money on three occasions; however, AB= D AL AZIZ AWDA indicated he no longer kept bank accounts and did not collect or disburse money. (83)

On or about April 10, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to other PIJ members which addressed scheduling problems with the PIJ Shura Council meeting and his suggestions to reorgani= ze the Shura Council. (81)<= /o:p>

On or about April= 10, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MAZEN AL-NAJJAR = and complained about the fighting among PIJ members and the difficulty in determining the location for a meeting of the PIJ Shura Council. (83.1)

On or about April 10, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $4,400 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to ICP, purportedly for “Quantity 44 orphans,” which was deposited into= an ICP account at First Union National Bank.

On or about April 11, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi stating that a meeting of = the Shura Council should be held as soon as possible because PIJ members ABD AL AZIZ AWDA and Fathi Shiqaqi had frozen PIJ funds and PIJ members in the Territories were without money. The facsimile also said that as a consequence of the actions of ABD AL AZIZ AWDA and Fathi Shiqaqi, "3,000 magazines" had been lost. Finally, the facsimile stated that= the recent PIJ suicide terrorist act at Afula was done with the assistance of HAMAS, the cost of the joint operation had been “90," and the de= ad terrorist was named “Raed.”&nb= sp; (84)

On or about April 11, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and GHASSAN ZAY= ED BALLUT discussed possible dates for SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN to visit and SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN asked GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT if he had heard about "Raed,"= who blew himself up. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT indicated that he had read about it in the paper. (85)

On or about April 12, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator Three,= who was outside of Florida, in which they discussed difficulties with traveling= to Lebanon on a United States passport. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN instructed Unindicted Co-Conspirator Three to use= his second passport and laughingly said the only way anyone would ever know was= if they were listening to them. = (86)

On or about April 13, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI who was in Engl= and, in which they discussed: (a) = money SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had received; (b) BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's upcoming travel to the United States; (c) SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's upcoming travel to the Sudan; (d) the difficulties in getting PIJ members abroad to meet; (e) a pe= rson who had been caught at a border with $30,000.00; (f) the PIJ in the Territories; (g) a bus bombing that occurred the previous week and how the "boy" was from the PIJ while the car and bomb were from HAMAS; and (h) SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s concern about the boy's whereabouts and activities the night before the bombing.&n= bsp; (87)

On or about April 14, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a three page facsimile listing people killed and names and account numbers of people receiving money on their behalf. (B) On or about April 15, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN re-transmitted the sa= me three page facsimile to MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB in Syria. (88.1); (88.3)

On or about April 15, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which commented on the location = of a prospective meeting and

(88)

On or about April 15, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, in wh= ich they discussed the financial difficulties of MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he would support MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI should assist RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH.&nb= sp; They agreed that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH did not work efficiently or raise money well. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI said he recently spoke with Fathi Shiqaqi, who said he would transfer sixty per cen= t of the money due the Tampa group. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said that during the PIJ financial problems Fathi Shiqaqi had probably received $2,000,000.00 but had not sent even $30,000.00 to Tampa.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN believed Fathi Shiqaqi should send $19,000.00 to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH for back pay and $10,000.00 to MAZEN AL-NAJJAR for five months' back pay. Finally, they discussed that there= would be $700,000.00 available once the PIJ put its new financial procedures in place. (89)=

On or about April 15, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT had a telephone conversation during which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s travel plans and the reaction to = the Afula bombing. SAMI AMIN AL-A= RIAN also spoke with Naim Nasser Bulbol and discussed Suliman Odeh and meeting in the future. (97.1)=

On or about April 16, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which discussed having the meeting of the PIJ Shura Council in Damascus, Syria, and the number of memb= ers necessary for a quorum. (89.1= )

On or about April 16, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, in wh= ich they discussed: (a) the upcom= ing PIJ meeting which Fathi Shiqaqi wanted held in Damascus, Syria; (b) whether SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN should travel to Syria; (c) whether officials in Syria w= ould speak Arabic; (d) whether SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN would be searched and whether = he needed to take a document with him; (e) their anger that Fathi Shiqaqi was = not assisting them with obtaining an entry and exit visa; and (f) whether SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN should offer to host the meeting in Tampa since four were there. S= AMI AMIN AL-ARIAN laughingly said that several of the members would like it and would not want to leave. (90)=

On or about April 16, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which addressed the location of a proposed PIJ meeting and the number of people needed for a quorum. (91)

On or about April 22, 1994, Fathi Shiqaqi wire transferred $19,984.50 to a bank account of SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOU= DEH at First Union National Bank in Florida via a bank in Beirut which used the Bank of New York as its United States correspondent. (93)

On or about April 24, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Samir (last name unknown), who w= as outside of Florida, in which they discussed an announcement that HAMAS and Arafat had reached a unification. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said that the operation at Afula was accomplished= by the PIJ but the car and preparations were from HAMAS. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said the Afula Operation cost $90,000.00. SA= MI AMIN AL-ARIAN also said he would send the papers to Samir via facsimile. (94)

On or about April 24, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Samir of the Islamic Jihad Movement's Circular Number 11, dated April 20, 1994. The document detailed the posture of the PIJ and HAMAS inside the Territories. (95)<= /span>

On or about April 25, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who w= as in England, in which they discussed the different factions within the PIJ.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he was not= going to go to the Sudan or Syria as he could not resolve the problems in those places. (96)

On or about April 25, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which addressed problems related= to the attendance of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB at the upcoming meeting of the PIJ Shura Council. (98)

On or about April 28, 1994, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation during which they discussed the upcoming PIJ meeting, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's concern about a quorum, and whether BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR w= ould continue on the Shura Council. (98.1)

On or about April 29, 1994, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $1,000 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. On or about August= 22, 1994, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH deposited this check into his personal account = at First Union Bank.

On or about April 30, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH in which they discussed the possible seizure of money they sent to the Territories. (99.1)

On or about May 4, 1994, SAMEEH TA= HA HAMMOUDEH sent $16,000.00 via check from his bank account at First Union National Bank in Florida to a banking account for WISE at Nations Bank in Tampa, Florida. (100)

&n= bsp; On or about May 7, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Salem, which contained a list of names and account numbers for martyrs and their beneficiaries. (101)

On or about June 6, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI who wa= s in England, in which they discussed: (a) negative articles and activities regarding Sheik Al Ghannoushi, which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN blamed on Jews; (b) that Fathi Shiqaqi had sent $13,000.00 to “The Center;” and (c) that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED N= AFI had asked RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH to tell Fathi Shiqaqi to send money to M= AZEN AL-NAJJAR and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI.&n= bsp; Further, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI stated that the money may have co= me from the "North." (= 102)

On or about July 3, 1994, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI had a telephone conversation about obtaining money for MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and SAMEEH TA= HA HAMMOUDEH. (103)

On or about July 15, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN spoke by telephone with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI about financial matters, including the fact that they anticipated $30,000.00 coming from overseas sources to support BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. (104)<= o:p>

On or about July 26, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi regarding the meeting of t= he PIJ Shura Council and Fathi Shiqaqi's hope that all in the PIJ would support it. (105)

On or about July 27, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which stated that the PIJ Shura Council had met and which urged SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and BASHIR MUSA MO= HAMMED NAFI to present their proposal. (106)

On or about July 29, 1994, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile to Ahmed Yousef of a draft proposal to unify Palestinian activities in the Territories, including those of the PIJ and HAMAS. (107)

On or about August 10, 1994, a conspirator caused a $14,936.60 wire transfer to a WISE bank account at Nat= ions Bank in Tampa, Florida, from a bank account in the Republic of Sudan. (108)

On or about September 4, 1994, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ,&n= bsp; murdered one person and injured several people in a shooting attack = in the vicinity of Morag Junction in or near the Gaza Strip. (109)

On or about September 5, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile of an official PIJ report on PIJ letterhead w= ith a PIJ logo, dated September 5, 1994, in which the PIJ claimed responsibility for the attack on September 4, 1994 in the Gaza Strip. (110)

On or about September 6, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile which contained an official PIJ report dated September 6, 1994, regarding the arrest and detention of “Mujahideen” by the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a consequence of the September 4, 1994 PIJ at= tack in the vicinity of Morag Junction. The facsimile blamed the PA for collaborating with Israel during the Intifada; accused the PA of serving the Israeli settlers as opposed to the Palestinians; announced that the arrest and detention of PIJ freedom fighte= rs would not stop or change PIJ strategy or its political position; declared t= hat the PIJ would continue its activities regardless of PA peace initiatives; a= nd contained a list of PIJ members who were arrested as a result of the latest terror act. (B) On the same day, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received several more facsimiles which included an official PIJ communique claiming responsibility for the PIJ attack on September 4, 1994, that resul= ted in the killing or wounding of three Israelis. (111)(A); (111)(B)

On or about September 7, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN received a four-page facsimile which included a press release on P= IJ letterhead, with PIJ logo, issued by Dr. Fathi Shiqaqi, Secretary General of the PIJ, denouncing Yasser Ar= afat and the PA for their actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank town of Jericho and listing the names of fifty PIJ members jailed by the PA. (112)

On or about September 8, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN re-transmitted by facsimile the PIJ communique he had received on September 6, 1994, announcing responsibility for the September 4, 1994 PIJ = attack. (113)

On or about September 8, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN re-transmitted by facsimile an official PIJ communique on PIJ letterhead with a PIJ logo, criticizing the PA for collaboration with the Zionists and praising the martyrs. (114)

On or about October 26, 1994,= MAZEN AL-NAJJAR wrote a $12,500 check drawn on the MWS account at First Union Ban= k, payable to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH deposited this check into his personal account= .

On or about November 11, 1994, a co-conspirator associated with the PIJ murdered three people and wounded approximately eleven in a suicide bombing in the vicinity of Netzarim Junct= ion, Gaza Strip. (115)<= /span>

On or about November 11, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a note to be sent via facsimile (see facsimile sent on Novem= ber 14, 1994), which announced his pride in the recent attack by the PIJ. He asked that God bless the effort= s of the PIJ and accept its “martyrs,” and urged PIJ members to be cautious and alert. (116)

On or about November 12, 1994= , SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile of a PIJ communique announcing responsibility for the PIJ attack on November 11, 1994, which resulted in t= he deaths of three Israelis and the injury of several others. (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN re-transmitted by facsimile the PIJ communique he had received earlier that= day announcing responsibility for the PIJ attack on November 11, 1994. (117)(A); (117)(B)

On or about November 14, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a note via facsimile (see November 11, 1994) which he had wri= tten three days earlier and explained that he had been unable to send the note because of the unavailability of an open line. (118)

On or about November 15, 1994, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile of an official PIJ communique dated November = 14, 1994, which addressed the crackdown on the PIJ and the arrests of its members. (119)

On or about December 14, 1994, conspirators transmitted facsimiles from WISE/ICP which blamed the United S= tates and President Clinton for the problems in the Middle East, criticized Israel and the PA and stated that the PIJ, HAMAS and Iran were the vanguards of Islam. (120)

On or about January 22, 1995, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered twenty-two people and inju= red several others in a double suicide bombing at Beit Lid, Israel. (121)

On or about January 23, 1995, RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which indicated th= at the relationship between the PIJ and Iran was improving and invited RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH to accompany Fathi Shiqaqi on a visit to Iran. (121.1)

On or about January 25, 1995, RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile which included a bulletin from the Department of Treasury announcing Presidential Executive Order 12947, which prohibited financial transactions with terrorists and terrorist organizatio= ns that threatened to disrupt the Middle East peace process, including the PIJ= and HAMAS. The bulletin listed Fa= thi Shiqaqi and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA as “Specially Designated Terrorists.” (122)=

On or about January 26, 1995, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and MAZEN AL-NAJJ= AR received a facsimile at WISE/ICP in Tampa, Florida, which contained an arti= cle about the Beit Lid bombing, the bombers Salah Abdel Hamid Shaker and Anwar Mohamad Atiah Sukkar, the PIJ, and how money and resources spent on Arab Ar= mies could be better spent to support the PIJ.&= nbsp; (123)

On or about February 2, 1995, RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile which glorified the Beit Lid suicide bombing and condemned the United States.&n= bsp; (123.2)

On or about February 5, 1995, RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile which contained an interview of Fathi Shiqaqi in which he discussed the PIJ.&nbs= p; (123.3)

On or about February 6, 1995, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator Four a= nd discussed the recent Presidential Executive Order against terrorists. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN belittled the O= rder, called it propaganda and nonsense and claimed it only targeted people such = as Fathi Shiqaqi and operations outside the United States. (124)

On or about February 6, 1995, a co-conspirator at WISE re-transmitted a facsimile to Bahrain which containe= d an article praising the two PIJ "martyrs" who died as a result of the Beit Lid terrorist attack in January 1995.= (125)

On or about February 9, 1995, a co-conspirator at WISE sent a facsimile to a number utilized by Fathi Shiqa= qi in Syria which included published interviews of Specially Designated Terror= ists Fathi Shiqaqi, Secretary General of the PIJ, and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, the spiritual leader of the PIJ. = In his interview, Fathi Shiqaqi discussed the escalation of violence by the PIJ and the relationship of the PIJ to Iran and Syria. (126)

On or about February 9, 1995, RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which set forth a plan to publish a collection of the speeches and eulogies that had been delivered on behalf of the Beit Lid bombers Shaker and Sukkar. (127)

On or about February 10, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which addressed his secu= rity concerns regarding the use of DHL, a commercial carrier, to send and receive paperwork. The facsimile also= said SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN favored mails being sent through Europe because direct movements from the Middle East were subject to more scrutiny. (128)

On or about February 10, 1995, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile which included a United States Senate Resolut= ion 69 condemning the PIJ for the January 22, 1995 double suicide bombing at Be= it Lid, Israel. Also included wa= s a preliminary analysis of “The Omnibus AntiTerrorism Act of 1995.” (129)=

On or about February 10, 1995= , SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a letter to Ismail Al-Shatti in Kuwait asking for money= for the PIJ. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN b= ragged about the January 22, 1995 Beit Lid bombing, and cited the bombing as an example of what PIJ could achieve. He asked for money and said that Shaker and Sukkar left large famili= es and debts; he also wrote that the PIJ was poor and destitute and indicated = the Iranians were providing little financial assistance. He wrote that, despite the hardshi= ps, the PIJ carried out distinctive operations which all the Arab armies lacked= the strength to execute. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN noted that the link with the brothers in HAMAS was very good and improving, and there were serious attempts at unification and permanent coo= rdination. In the letter, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN requested additional money so that operations such as Beit Lid could continue. (130)

On or about February 11, 1995, SAM= I AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who w= as outside of Florida, in which they used coded language to discuss money issues and assistance to WISE by the International Institute of Islamic Thought. In addition, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN sp= oke to BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI about 170 people who were listed as co-conspirato= rs in a New York terrorism prosecution being conducted by "Zionist circles." (131)

On or about February 18, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile which said “the paperwork” had arrived. The facsimile addressed an account number RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had requested and stat= ed RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH could make a direct transfer. Finally, the facsimile set forth a proposed agreement between HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority. (132)

On or about February 19, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to brother Salem in Iran, which discussed= the proposed agreement RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had received from Ja’fir between HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority, and the response of the PIJ. (132.1)

On or about February 19, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a coded facsimile to Ja’fir in Gaza. (132.2)

On or about February 19, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi, which referred to= the previous correspondence with Ja’fir, the position that PIJ should ado= pt in light of the pending agreement between HAMAS and the Palestinian Authori= ty, and inquired about the availability of communication equipment. (132.3)

On or about February 20, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi, in Iran, that answered = the recently received facsimile. (132.4)

On or about February 20, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi, in Iran, which described the response that the PIJ should take to a proposed truce between HAMAS and= the Palestinian Authority, including publishing a newsletter. (132.5)

On or about February 21, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi, which described t= he PIJ’s attempts to obtain the return of PIJ money held by MUHAMMED TAS= IR HASSAN AL-KHATIB and the status of the PIJ’s response to the agreement between HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority. (132.6)

On or about February 21, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi, in Iran, which suggested how to deal with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (132.7)

On or about February 21, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi, in Iran, which addressed several matters including a discussion that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had had with SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN regarding how to get MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATI= B to return PIJ money. (132.8)

On or about February 22, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile in Tampa, Florida from Fathi Shiqaqi which included a published article which was unfavorable toward the PIJ and mentioned the financial dispute within the PIJ. (133)

On or about February 24, 1995, RAM= ADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which contained information about a Bank of Boston account number. The facsimile also indicated that a meeting had gone well in Iran and the amount of money coming into the PIJ w= ould increase within a month. (B)<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The next day, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHA= LLAH sent a facsimile in response to Israel, which confirmed the name of the bank where money was to be sent and that the city was “Springfield” = not “Springfile.” (13= 5)(A); (135.1)

On or about March 4, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with an unidentified male in Syria. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALL= AH mentioned that he had recently seen videos made by persons preparing to participate in suicide bombings and was very moved. (137)

On or about March 4, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile signed by Abu Nidal from the Gaza Strip. (B) Later, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH re-transmitted the facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi in Damascus, Syria. The facsimile directed Fathi Shiqa= qi to contact Nassar Yousef/Abu Jousif. (138)(A); (138)(B)

On or about March 5, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi, who sent his rega= rds to BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and indicated he would speak by telephone with RAMADAN ABDUL= LAH SHALLAH later that day. (138.= 1)

On or about March 5, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Rashed Al-Ghanoushi in w= hich RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH referred to a time when he had seen a martyrdom vi= deo at a festival and then received news of the November 11, 1994 bicycle bombi= ng at Netzarim Junction. (139)

On or about March 5, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, had a telephone conversation with an unidentified male in which they discussed the possible release of PIJ members from Israeli jails= as a goodwill gesture in connection with an upcoming religious holiday. They also discussed aligning the P= IJ with HAMAS, sending tape recorded messages into the Territory, disciplining MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB for not returning PIJ property, and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s anger that a magazine had advance notice of a PIJ suicide attack. (140)

On or about March 8, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi about acquiring a portable telephone, its range and price, and whether it needed to be used in conjunction with a base unit. Fathi Shiqaqi also inquired about a satellite phone. (B) The following day, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversa= tion with Fathi Shiqaqi in which RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH said he had spoken with SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN about purchasing telephones; however, the issue was comp= lex because the purchase records for such equipment were kept. Fathi Shiqaqi again emphasized tha= t, in addition to a portable phone to be used in conjunction with a base unit, he= was interested in a satellite phone. (141)(A); (141)(B)

On or about March 14, 1995, GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT attempted to have a telephone conversation with RAMADAN ABDULL= AH SHALLAH. (141.1)

On or about March 15, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent Fathi Shiqaqi a facsimile regarding RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI’s concerns about SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and the PIJ working with HAMAS in the United States. (B) On the same day, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversati= on with Fathi Shiqaqi in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s desir= e to meet with HAMAS in the United States. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH said he did not want consultation with HAMA= S to be a pre-condition to action by the PIJ.&n= bsp; They discussed that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR we= re upset because they had spent their lives working for the PIJ and would have nothing to show for it if the PIJ were annexed by HAMAS. (142)(A); (142)(B)

On or about March 15, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Yousef in Gaza. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH mentioned= his security concerns that anything sent to RAMADAN

(143)

On or about March 15, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was overseas, in which Fathi Shiqaqi said that Yousef needed to call him. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH responded that Yousef was at “The Center.” (B) Later, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH ha= d a telephone conversation with Yousef and told him Fathi Shiqaqi would wait for him to call and gave him Fathi Shiqaqi's telephone number in Syria. (144)(A); (144)(B)

On or about March 15, 1995, HATEM = NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH in which t= hey discussed material which HATEM NAJI FARIZ had for publication in the PIJ newspaper, “Al-Esteqlal.” RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH advised HATEM NAJI FARIZ to contact Yousef about the newspaper. HATEM NA= JI FARIZ expressed his concern regarding a package he had recently sent to Gaza. (144.1)

On or about March 17, 1995, HATEM = NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation with Maha Shallah, who told him that the package he sent had arrived in the mail.&n= bsp; HATEM NAJI FARIZ expressed relief when he learned that the package h= ad not been opened en route. (14= 4.2)

On or about March 17, 1995, HATEM = NAJI FARIZ sent a facsimile to WISE which contained an edition of “Al-Esteqlal.” (1= 44.3)

On or about March 18, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH caused a facsimile to be sent to “Brother YousefR= 21; in Gaza and directed Yousef to ascertain whether ten more PIJ members had b= een arrested. (B) Shortly thereafter,

(145)(A); (145)(B)

On or about March 18, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile in Tampa, Florida. The facsimile: (1) contained a declaration from P= IJ headquarters on PIJ stationery with PIJ logo; (2) demanded the release of a= ll holy warriors from Palestinian prisons; and (3) dared the Palestinian Autho= rity to arrest all those who cheered for the success of their recent operation at Beit Lid, Israel. (146)<= /o:p>

On or about March 18, 1995, HATEM = NAJI FARIZ and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation and discuss= ed their concerns about the delivery of a package for RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. (146.1)

On or about March 19, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile in Tampa, Florida which contained a recently published interview of Fathi Shiqaqi. In the interview, Fathi Shiqaqi described the formation and evolution of the PIJ, the objective of the PIJ,= the location of PIJ bases or training camps, the relationship of the PIJ with Hizballah, Iran’s financial assistance to the PIJ, and the impossibil= ity of the co-existence of Israel and a Palestinian state. Fathi Shiqaqi further discussed his determination to seek the destruction of Israel because it was an imperiali= st base and partner of the United States.&nbs= p; He also said that suicide operations would continue and he would fig= ht to the death. (147)

On or about March 21, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from PIJ headquarters in Damascus, Sy= ria which stated that two PIJ members had been killed two days before when a bo= mb blew up in their hands. (148)=

On or about March 21, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which discussed his crit= ique of Fathi Shiqaqi’s inte= rview. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH also disc= ussed his success in obtaining information regarding the communication equipment Fathi Shiqaqi had inquired about previously. (148.1)

On or about March 21, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi stating he had read RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s remarks concerning the interview of Fathi Shiqaqi which had previously been sent via facsimile. With respect to the interview, Fat= hi Shiqaqi stated that he also sought the opinions of MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. (149)

On or about March 21, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH caused a $10,000 wire transfer to be sent from his account= at NationsBank in Tampa, Florida to an account belonging to Ehab Bseisso at the Bank of Boston in Springfield, Massachusetts. (B) On or about March 24, 1995, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH caused a $5,500 wi= re transfer, drawn on his account, to be sent to the same account belonging to Ehab Bseisso at the Bank of Boston in Springfield, Massachusetts. (C) On or about April 13, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH caused Ehab Bse= isso to send a $43,025 wire transfer drawn on his account to an account in Egypt= .

On or about April 7, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation w= ith an unidentified male, who was outside of Florida, in which RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH discussed money and said he had shipped the unidentified male “ten books” from RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and “five and o= ne half” from the "Sufi guy."= They also agreed that they wanted PIJ members within the Territories= to receive training which would be funded by the United Nations. (B) The next day, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to Omar Ja’Fir regarding their conversation the day before. The facsimile identified the peopl= e who were to receive the $15,500. = (150); (150.1)

On or about April 9, 1995, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered eight people and wounded approximately forty when a suicide bomber in an automobile detonated a bomb beside a bus in Kfar Darom, Gaza Strip.&nb= sp; Several United States citizens were passengers on the bus, including Shlomo Ben-Haim, Alisa Flatow, Chava T. Knapp and Kesari M. Ruza. This PIJ bombing killed Alisa Flat= ow, age 20. (151)

On or about April 9, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile, on PIJ letterhead, with the PIJ logo= , in Tampa, Florida. The facsimile announced the death of the PIJ martyr Khalid Al Khatib, who carried out the suicide bombing at Kfar Darom. (B) Approximately one = minute after this facsimile was received it was re-transmitted to WISE/ICP. (152)(A); (152)(B)

On or about April 11, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a heavily coded facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi which discussed the PIJ and its members. (B) Later, RAMADAN ABD= ULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Fathi Shiqaqi which discussed a recent meeting at Fathi Shiqaqi’s home regarding the activities of the Palestinian Authority against the PIJ, the authorization to have discussions with HAMAS abroad and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB’S demands regar= ding the return of PIJ funds. (152= .1); (152.2)

On or about April 11, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile which detailed the status of trials of accused PIJ members and their sentences.&n= bsp; (152.3)

On or about April 11, 1995, RAMADA= N ABDULLAH SHALLAH received by facsimile a PIJ press release from outside the State of Florida which demanded that PIJ members arrested or sentenced in the afterm= ath of the Kfar Darom suicide bombing be immediately released. (B) On the same day, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received by facsimile a proposed press release from outside the State of Florida from Fathi Shiqaqi regarding the suicide bombing at Kfar Darom. The proposed press release critici= zed the Palestinian Authority and stated the PIJ would continue its pattern of suicide bombings. A handwritt= en note on the facsimile mentioned payments for the period of February 28 thro= ugh March 27 in the amount of 108 Jordanian “magazines.” (153)(A); (153)(B)

On or about April 11, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile from Yousef stating that the publicat= ion of the newspaper would be halted temporarily because Yousef and his partner were being pursued by the authorities.&nbs= p; The facsimile also stated that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's brother, O= mar, had received a life sentence. (154)

On or about April 11, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation w= ith Fathi Shiqaqi, who was outside the State of Florida, in which RAMADAN ABDUL= LAH SHALLAH said he had recently transferred fifteen and a half (ten plus five = and a half) to Ja'Fir. Fathi Shiq= aqi asked why RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had not notified him and that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's money was not routed through the special committee. Fathi Shiqaqi said Ja'Fir had rece= ived over $100,000 last month. (15= 5)

On or about April 13, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with an unknown male in Syria. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALL= AH discussed his family’s situation after the arrest of his brother and = the status of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. (156.1)=

On or about April 15, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was in Syria, in which they discussed the PIJ's rejection of any peace settlement = with Israel, their disappointment that HAMAS was not more active, their concern about the Palestinian Authority and the fact that the PIJ had no contact or dialog with them, and that PIJ members SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL-NAJJ= AR were doing well. (157)

On or about April 15, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH learned during a telephone conversation that The Tampa Tribune was investigating the connection between WISE and USF with a fo= cus on SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. (157.2= )

On or about April 17, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with an unidentified male in Syria, in which RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH indicated he was very concerned th= at the local newspaper would soon be printing articles about their connection = to the PIJ. (158)

On or about April 18, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Abu Nadel in Gaza in whi= ch they discussed Nadel assisting RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH in gaining entry in= to the Territories. RAMADAN ABDU= LLAH SHALLAH said he needed to return to the Territories because there was a voi= d in the PIJ which only he could fill. (161)

On or about April 18, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH transmitted a facsimile from Tampa, Florida to “Brot= her Shaker” (Fathi Shiqaqi) in Syria, indicating that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH agreed that Fathi Shiqaqi should meet directly with the leaders of the Palestinian Authority and create a dialogu= e. They said that, at the least, this= would have a calming effect and perhaps the Palestinian Authority would release s= ome PIJ members from jail. (160)<= o:p>

On or about April 27, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Abu As'ad in Gaza in whi= ch they discussed RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s concern that the United Sta= tes Congress might draft an Anti-Terrorism Bill which could ease the ability of= the United States to deport suspected terrorists. He was also concerned because a newspaper had asked to interview him about the relationship between WISE/ICP and USF. (162)

On or about April 27, 1995, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN received a facsimile from The Tampa Tribune which contained several questions regarding WISE, ICP, PIJ and Fathi Shiqaqi. (162.1)

On or about April 29, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was in Syria, in which they discussed the press coverage regarding SAMI AMIN AL-AR= IAN, including questions The Tampa Tribune had sent SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN ab= out WISE, ICP, PIJ, Fathi Shiqaqi, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN= and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. RAMADAN ABDU= LLAH SHALLAH was critical of the pending terrorism legislation and indicated tha= t if it passed, it would become difficult to accomplish things in the United Sta= tes, remarking that “Tel Aviv will be easier than here.” (163)

On or about May 4, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with an unidentified male in = Gaza in which they discussed RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s concern that authorities in the United States might open a package of “magazines” that was to be sent to him. (164)

On or about May 5, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with an unidentified person in Damascus, Syria in which they discussed RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s be= lief that the PIJ communication links needed to be upgraded. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH also told= the unidentified person to be very careful and to tell his people "inside&= quot; to be careful because Israel might take action during the holiday. (165)

On or about May 9, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was in Syria, in which RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH discussed his immigration problems= and stated his desire to leave the United States and his joy upon hearing Fathi Shiqaqi tell him he could. (1= 66)

On or about May 10, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who were in Tampa, Florida,= had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was in Syria. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI said he advised Fathi Shiqaqi to take Ziyad Nakhaleh, a/k/a Abu Tareq, and someone = from the North with him when he went to retrieve the PIJ money from MUHAMMED TAS= IR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. Fathi Shiqa= qi spoke in detail about the conflict with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB and= ABD AL AZIZ AWDA. BASHIR MUSA MOH= AMMED NAFI and Fathi Shiqaqi then discussed whether RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH could return to the Territories. Fa= thi Shiqaqi suggested that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN carry out a counter-offensive in = the media. Finally, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI urged Fathi Shiqaqi to decrease his contacts with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. (167)<= /o:p>

On or about May 12, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile to GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT regarding the sta= tus of RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and his wife’s United States visas and the necessity of RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s wife renewing her Palestinian Authority travel permit. RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH also discussed the justification she would use to travel to the Territories. (167.1)

On or about May 21, 1995, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with MUHA= MMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB, who was outside the State of Florida, in which they discussed ABD AL AZIZ AWDA’s brother who had been jailed and question= ed for about seventy-five days. = SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN expressed concern that interrogators had only questioned ABD = AL AZIZ AWDA's brother about one person and whether that person was the leader overseas. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN = also asked if ABD AL AZIZ AWDA's brother had been questioned about RAMADAN ABDUL= LAH SHALLAH. (168)

On or about May 24, 1995, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with GHAS= SAN ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florida, in which SAMI AMIN AL-A= RIAN requested that GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT contact Naim Nasser Bulbol because SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN wanted to speak with the person who was recently released aft= er being interrogated by the authorities.&nbs= p; SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN was very interested in questioning the individual about his interrogation. (170= )

On or about May 25, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile comprising communiques and clips from several newspapers. These ite= ms included a press release by MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB in which he said the PIJ would increase its terrorist activity. (170.1)

On or about May 30, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent Fathi Shiqaqi a facsimile which consisted of several pages of articles from The Tampa Tribune regarding SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s connection to terrorists and terrorist organizations inclu= ding the PIJ. (170.2)

On or about May 30, 1995, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with BASH= IR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI who was in Virginia, in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s admiration for another terrorist leader. They also discussed how to appropr= iately respond to the ongoing press investigation of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN at the Uni= versity of South Florida and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's insistence that it would be handled properly. (171)<= /o:p>

On or about June 1, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile which contained an article on the spl= it within the PIJ and a response by members of the PIJ which denied any dissension. (171.1)

On or about June 1, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile regarding the split in the PIJ between Fathi Shiqaqi, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA and MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB, and the PIJ's attempts to keep this out of the press. (171.2)

On or about June 1, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAF= I in which they discussed articles about a split in the PIJ and their anger that= the reporter had mentioned members of the PIJ Shura Council and other PIJ membe= rs by name. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED= NAFI said he would take care of the matter.&nbs= p; (B) Approximately fift= een minutes later, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with Fathi Shiqaqi, who was in Syria, in which they discussed a Lebanese magazine article which stated that the PIJ was going to split. Fathi Shiqaqi also exp= ressed the belief that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN should move to another location in the United States because of bad publicity.&nb= sp; They also mentioned that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI was disturbed by = the articles in The Tampa Tribune because BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's na= me had been mentioned. (172)(A); (172)(B)

On or about June 2, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a facsimile from Tampa, Florida to Fathi Shiqaqi in S= yria which described an article concerning the split in the PIJ. The facsimile also relayed a conversation that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI had the evening before, and stated that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had recently sent a threatening

(173)

On or about June 2, 1995, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a facsimile which contained a demand letter to The Tampa Tribune to apologize, punish the reporters and pay damages. (173.1)

On or about June 4, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH sent a coded facsimile to Fathi Shiqaqi. (173.6)

On or about June 8, 1995, RAMADAN = ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with Abu Mohamed in which RAMADAN ABDU= LLAH SHALLAH said he was concerned that there was a wiretap on his facsimile. (174)

On or about June 10, 1995, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAF= I in which BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI directed RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH to meet w= ith MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and others to rally support for SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN at USF. (175)

On or about June 16, 1995, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. MUHAMMED TASIR HAS= SAN AL-KHATIB said he would not leave Fathi Shiqaqi alone. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said that could= hurt all of the other partners. (1= 75.1)

On or about June 16, 1995, HATEM N= AJI FARIZ called SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. HATEM NAJI FARIZ asked about the status of RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH = and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN responded that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was traveling. HATEM NAJI FARIZ said he had recently received some excelle= nt papers and newspapers. SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN responded by warning HATEM NAJI FARIZ not to send anything, to keep it, distribute it in his area, and be very cautious. (176)

On or about July 3, 1995, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN swore in an Alien Petition For Alien Worker to INS that BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI would be employed as Research Director at WISE. (177)

On or about August 6, 1995, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said the amount received was “twenty-five.” SA= MI AMIN AL-ARIAN asked BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI for RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's telephone number. (178)<= /o:p>

On or about August 25, 1995, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN filed a visa renewal petition with the INS on behalf of BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI. (179)

On or about September 1, 1995, MAZ= EN AL-NAJJAR wrote a $5,000 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to WISE, w= hich was deposited into the WISE account.

On or about October 25, 1995, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR executed an Affidavit filed with the INS in support of BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's alien employment petition.= In the Affidavit, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR stated that he and SAMI AMIN AL-AR= IAN had sufficient financial means to fund BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's salary.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> MAZEN AL-NAJJAR further stated tha= t in 1993, he contributed $36,000.00 to WISE and that in January and February 19= 94, he had in excess of $50,000.00 available to support the operations of WISE. (180)=

On or about October 30, 1995, in t= he early morning hours, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received a telephone call from Unindicted Co-Conspirator Two in which Unindicted Co-Conspirator Two asked whether SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had heard that Fathi Shiqaqi had been killed. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN indicated he had heard and then refused to talk. (B) Later that day, he= had a telephone conversation with MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN indicated he wa= nted to meet with MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. (181)(A); (181)(B)

On or about October 30, 1995, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI made a telephone call to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI whispered during this conversation and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said the matter had been complicated and inquiries had begun. (181.1)

On or about October 30, 1995, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with a journalist with The St. Petersburg Times. When the journalist asked about RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH being named the Secretary General of the PIJ, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN falsely stated that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s name must have been mixed up with someone else and falsely stated he only knew RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH as RAMADAN ABDULLAH. (B) Later, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had another telephone conversation with th= e journalist of The St. Petersburg Times. During this conversation, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN expressed shock and surprise and falsely stated there was nothing RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had = done while at WISE to indicate any political affiliation. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN falsely stated = that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was not involved in any

(182)(A); (182)(B)

On or about October 31, 1995, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR caused a facsimile to be sent from WISE which explained its mission and its experience with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and falsely denied any knowledge of RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH’s association or affiliation with any political group in the Middle East. (183)=

On or about November 2, 1995, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had yet another telephone conversation with the same journalist fr= om The St. Petersburg Times in which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN falsely stated that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had been a genuine scholar while at WISE and that = SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had no suspicion that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was affiliated with a terrorist organization. (184)

On or about November 20, 1995, in = Tampa, Florida, at WISE/ICP, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR possessed:

The Manifes= to of the PIJ which described: (a) the organizational structure; (b) the duties a= nd responsibilities of various offices, and, (c) the goals and principles of t= he organization. The stated prin= ciples included the rejection of any peaceful solution for the Palestinian cause, = and the affirmation of the Jihad solution and the martyrdom style as the only choice for liberation. The Manifesto further stated that one of the PIJ's specific goals was to create= a situation of terror, instability and panic. One of the explicit means and meth= ods of the Movement was to adopt a guerilla war system (hit and run). The Manifesto referred to the Unit= ed States as the “Great Satan - America;”

A computer = file at WISE which contained the wills of three PIJ members who died committing a terrorist act. The wills indi= cated that the men intended to commit a violent suicide act for the PIJ;

A letter da= ted November 6, 1992, from Unindicted Co-Conspirator Five. In the letter, Unindicted Co-Consp= irator Five said that his group viewed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, Khalil Shiqaqi, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA as part of an= d an extension of his group and promised to send the remainder of the money pled= ged previously. Unindicted Co-Conspirator Five instructed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN that he could use the mon= ey regardless of the party or the facade for which the money was designated;

A communique between PIJ and HAMAS entitled, "The Pact of Brotherhood and Cooperation." The document condemned violence be= tween the PIJ and HAMAS and stated that when the two organizations agreed they wo= uld cooperate with one another but when they disagreed, they would not resort to violence against one another.

(185)

On or about November 20, 1995, in = Tampa, Florida, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN possessed, at his residence:<= /p>

A doc= ument entitled the “Charter of the Center of Studies, the Intelligence and = the Information," which set forth a detailed description of the structure = and operation of a hostile intelligence organization in the United States and elsewhere. The document inclu= ded the organizational structure, duties, responsibilities, espionage methods a= nd targets, counterintelligence and precautionary measures, methods of reporti= ng and a cipher system to make the hostile intelligence organization appear to= be affiliated with a university;

(2)= A letter written to Ismail Al-Ashatti in Kuwait from SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, which requested a financial donation to the PIJ and stated that the bombers in a recent terror operation (Beit Lid, Israel - January 22, 1995) had left fami= lies and debts and urged a financial contribution so the PIJ could continue its = terror operations.

(186)

On or about December 8, 1995, Unin= dicted Co-Conspirator Six, who was at the home of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, told Khaled Al-Arian that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN would call from school and that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had said to not speak on the phone at the house. (188)

On or about January 11, 1996, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with another individual in which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN directed the individual to send information to him via facsim= ile at the home of Unindicted Co-Conspirator Seven. (189)

On March 4, 1996, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ bombed the Dizengoff Center Shopping Mall in Tel Av= iv, Israel during a children’s festival and murdered approximately thirte= en people and wounded approximately seventy-five, including United States citi= zens Ronald L. Koprowski and Julie K. Negrin.&n= bsp; (190)

On or about October 8, 1996, SAMEE= H TAHA HAMMOUDEH sent a facsimile which informed the receiver that SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had sent the books by sea. (191.5)

On or about October 28, 1996, RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH made a speech on the first anniversary of the death of Fat= hi Shiqaqi, to a group which included, among others, several Iranians, representatives from HAMAS and Hizballah and several future suicide bombers= . RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH said the = PIJ would avenge Shiqaqi’s death and make the lives of the enemy’s leaders and their allies a hell of explosions and fire. RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH also ment= ioned past successful PIJ terrorist attacks at Beit Lid, Kfar Darom and the Dizen= goff Center Shopping Mall. (193)

On or about March 17, 1997, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN had a coded telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator Eight in which they discussed whether "two things" had been sent = from Abu Omar to another individual overseas.&n= bsp; (194)

On or about August 11, 1997, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN engaged in a telephone conversation with another person in which t= hey discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's concerns about a recent Washington Post arti= cle regarding the designation of PIJ and HAMAS as terrorist organizations and references to Florida as a base of their United States operations. (195)

On or about September 23, 1997, MA= ZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation in which they= discussed the Egyptian authorities' recent interrogation of SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's brot= her about SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's activities.&nbs= p; (195.2)

On or about September 26, 1997, SA= MI AMIN AL-ARIAN who was in Tampa, Florida, had a telephone conversation with = Unindicted Co-Conspirator Nine, who was outside the State of Florida, who advised that= he had recently spoken with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI regarding his arrest in Egypt. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN res= ponded that the Egyptians had caught BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in possession of multiple passports. (196)

On or about January 19, 1998, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and stated that = he had just returned from out of town and was able to collect about “fif= teen magazines” ($15,000.00). (197)

On or about January 27, 1998, in t= he late evening hours, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator Nine and requested that Unindicted Co-Conspirator Nine leave his home in Northern Virginia so SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN could call h= im to relay a message. (198)

On or about May 17, 1998, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who was in England, and inform= ed BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI that he was sending a local newspaper article whi= ch concerned BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI. (199.19)

On or about May 18, 1998, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in Tampa, Florida, engaged in a telephone conversation wi= th Unindicted Co-Conspirator One, who was outside the State of Florida, and to= ld SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN to expect an additional "sum" and that a "letter" had already been sent.&= nbsp; SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN replied that he did not call because he did not w= ant to talk over the phone. (200)=

On or about June 2, 1998, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with another individual in which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN stated that if the individual delivered ten or twenty thousand dollars, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN could ensure its payoff or delivery to any destination. (201)=

On or about September 17, 1998, Unindicted Co-Conspirator Two had a telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator Eight who said, “your brother gave one of his friends = ten shirts ($10,000.00) as gifts.” (203)

On or about November 6, 1998, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ injured approximately twenty people= in a suicide car bombing at the Mahane Yehuda Market in Jerusalem, Israel. (204)

On or about November 28, 1998, MAZ= EN AL NAJJAR and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation about the high c= ost of a Guyana visa. (204.7)

On or about July 14, 1999, Unindic= ted Co-Conspirator Two, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a teleph= one conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspirator Eight, who was outside of Flori= da, in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s desire that Unindicted Co-Conspirator Eight bring six shirts ($6,000.00) with him when he came to visit. Unindicted Co-Conspira= tor Eight said there were only three shirts ($3,000.00) left which he would bri= ng; he had originally had twelve shirts ($12,000.00) and had previously sent ni= ne shirts ($9,000.00). (B) Unindicted Co-Conspirator Two then called SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and they had a conversation in which they discuss= ed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s shock that only three shirts ($3,000.00) were available because he thought sixteen ($16,000.00) remained available. (205)(A); (205)(B)

On or about July 20, 1999, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with the USF Credit Union and directe= d it to place $1,600.00 into his

(206)

On or about July 21, 1999, Unindic= ted Co-Conspirator Two had a telephone conversation with Unindicted Co-Conspira= tor Eight in which they discussed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s disappointment that more money was not available. Unindicted Co-Conspirator Eight explained that there had only been twelve shirts, nine had previously been sent, and he was going to bring three. (207)

On or about December 20, 1999, SAM= EEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and his father had a telephone conversation in which SAMEEH = TAHA HAMMOUDEH said he had collected money he would send to his father for distribution. His father urged caution and indicated that giving the money in installments would be better. (211.7)

On or about December 29, 1999, SAM= EEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH called his father who was overseas. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH asked his fa= ther to distribute money and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH would reimburse him by sending money overseas via courier. (= 212)

On or about January 15, 2000, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH called an individual who was intending to travel to the Midd= le East. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH m= ade arrangements with the individual to deliver funds to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH's father. (213)

On or about January 25, 2000, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation with his father, who was overse= as. and who instructed

(213.4)

On or about January 29, 2000, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH called his father overseas and told him he had sent another $2,000.00 with someone traveling to the Territories. (214)

On or about May 11, 2000, HATEM NA= JI FARIZ called SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. HATEM NAJI FARIZ spoke about recent elections at the mosque in Chicago. HATEM NAJI FARIZ sai= d the constitution for the mosque now specified that HATEM NAJI FARIZ and four ot= hers were permanent members of the Board. HATEM NAJI FARIZ asked SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH to convey this information to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIA= N to assure him that they were in control. (215)

On or about May 17, 2000, SAMEEH T= AHA HAMMOUDEH called a relative overseas and spoke about $15,000.00 which SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH would be sending to the relative. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH asked the re= lative to find someone who had an account in the United States in which he could deposit the funds and the relative could collect from that person in the Mi= ddle East. (216)=

On or about June 15, 2000, SAMEEH = TAHA HAMMOUDEH called a relative overseas and they discussed the delivery of mon= ey to the relative. (217)

On or about June 18, 2000, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR called SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH who complained about the amount of m= oney he was being paid at the IAF. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH stated that his salary at the IAF did not cover his living expenses. (218)

On or about June 18, 2000, SAMEEH = TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation with his mother about transferring fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars of his money overseas. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH’s moth= er cautioned him to be careful a= nd that everything had to be done in a clean manner. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH insisted that there was nothing to worry about because the money was from his earnings. (218.1)

On or about July 19, 2000, SAMI AM= IN AL-ARIAN, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a coded telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who was in England, in which t= hey discussed the

(219)

On or about August 7, 2000, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who was in England, about utilizing a contact of BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's in Egypt to obtain travel documents for MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. They then spoke about BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's problems with his immigration status in the United States. = Then they had a coded conversation about the account to which BASHIR MUSA MOHAMM= ED NAFI had sent money. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN then complained to BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI about SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH's request for a higher salary for both himself and his wife at the Islamic Academy of Florida. B= ASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI agreed to speak with SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. (220)

On or about August 8, 2000, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN, who was in the Middle District of Florida, called Unindicted Co-Conspirator Ten, who was outside the State of Florida. When SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN asked Unin= dicted Co-Conspirator Ten if anything was deposited in his account or his wife's account, Unindicted Co-Conspirator Ten replied there were "ten shirts." SAMI AMIN AL-AR= IAN then directed Unindicted Co-Conspirator Ten to send nine of them to the acc= ount of Unindicted Co-Conspirator Seven. (221)

Later in the day on August 8, 2000= , SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, who was outside the State of Florida, and told BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI that the issue of "the magazines" was resolved, but the travel document had not been received from Egypt. They then discuss= ed utilizing the press to support MAZEN AL-NAJJAR in his INS hearing by settin= g up an interview with ABD AL AZIZ AWDA to show that he had the permission of the Israelis to reside in the Gaza Strip. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN then asked BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI for ABD AL A= ZIZ AWDA's telephone number. BASH= IR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI told him to call back the next day to get the number. Additionally, they discussed BASHI= R MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI’s response to allegations in the press that he was a me= mber of the PIJ. (222)<= /span>

On or about August 8, 2000, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN directed HATEM NAJI FARIZ to arrange a newspaper interview with AB= D AL AZIZ AWDA. (223.1)=

On or about August 9, 2000, SAMI A= MIN AL-ARIAN and HATEM NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation about causing on= e or more newspaper articles to be written on ABD AL AZIZ AWDA. They desired to utilize these arti= cles in the INS hearing regarding MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and wanted them to portray ABD= AL AZIZ AWDA as a religious figure with no relation to the PIJ. (223.2)

On or about August 10, 2000, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with Ziad Abu-Amr and requested that a reluctant Ziad Abu-Amr travel to the United States and testify at the INS hearing for MAZEN AL-NAJJAR that the PIJ was involved in non-violent activities. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIA= N said he could find someone to testify to the non-violent activities of HAMAS but could not find someone to so testify regarding the other Islamic movements. (224)

On or about August 18, 2000, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI in whi= ch they discussed Ziad Abu-Amr's reluctance to assist in MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's INS hearing. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN directed BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI to utilize SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's daughter= 's e-mail address to communicate with SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN. BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI indicate= d he was preparing to give a detailed statement to MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's attorney. (225)

On or about August 23, 2000, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation during which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN instructed SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH to approach clinics in = the West Bank to attempt to obtain a document they could utilize as a 1990 $25,= 000.00 charitable receipt in MAZEN AL-NAJJAR’s INS hearing. (225.7)

On or about Augu= st 24, 2000, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH instructed his father in a telephone conversati= on to obtain a receipt for a contribution which was made in approximately 1990= to be utilized in MAZEN AL-NAJJAR’s INS hearing. (225.9)

On or about August 24, 2000, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said that Ziad Abu-Amr had provided a written affidavit which was to be sent back to Ziad Abu-Amr for his signature after the lawyers reviewed it. (226)

On or about October 10, 2000, SAMI= AMIN AL-ARIAN possessed a document which contained the Charter of the PIJ includ= ing sections addressing the "General Principles of the Movement," the "Objectives of the Movement" and the "Means." (B) Later in the day, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN sent a hand-edited copy of the Charter of the PIJ which he had received earlier on that date via facsimile= to a telephone number in the vicinity of Houston, Texas. (C) Still later that day, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN received by facsimile a cle= an copy of the Charter of the PIJ which incorporated the hand edited changes.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> (227)(A); (227)(B); (227)(C)<= /o:p>

On or about October 6, 2000, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and instru= cted SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH to type and fax a letter for the signature of ABD AL = AZIZ AWDA which would be utilized in MAZEN AL-NAJJAR’s INS hearing. (227.1)

On or about October 11, 2000, a facsimile containing the letter signed by ABD AL AZIZ AWDA was received at = the Islamic Academy of Florida. (= 227.2)

On or about October 11, 2000, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, who was in the Middle District of Florida, called his relatives, who were outside the State of Florida, and questioned them about= an FBI interview that day involving one of the brothers. One of the brothers said the FBI a= gent asked whether the Hammoudeh family was involved with the PIJ. (228)

On or about October 21, 2000, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, who was in the Middle District of Florida, called an indivi= dual outside the State of Florida. The individual told SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH that a Palestinian leader, Abu Amar, = had given terror organizations permission to commit violent acts. (229)

On or about November 2, 2000, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered two people in a bombing at= the Mahane Yehuda Market in Jerusalem, Israel.= (230)

On or about February 25, 2001, an individual in Tampa, Florida called SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. They discussed the amounts of rece= nt collections and that the money would be paid out in Tampa, Gaza, the West B= ank, Syria and Iraq. (231)

On or about March 14, 2001, Unindi= cted Co-Conspirator One spoke by teleph= one with SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. Unindicted Co-Conspirator One said = he would be going to London and asked for BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's telephone number. After providing 's telephone num= ber, <= o:p>

to come in May, give a speech, and collect donations. (232)

On or around July 25, 2001, in the Middle District of Florida, the PIJ operated a website on the internet which contained: (a) an interview of RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and an interview of Ziyad Nakhaleh, a/k/a Abu Tare= q, Deputy Secretary General of the PIJ; (b) a request for monetary donations; = (c) a list of newsletters and charts which listed the number of PIJ operations = by region between 1984 and 1999; (d) a list of the types of PIJ operations bet= ween 1984 and 1999 (including columns for grenade attacks, shooting, bombs, stabbing, explosive device TNT, kidnaping and killing); and (e) a detailed = list of the various operations carried out by the PIJ between 1984 to 1999 (including date of operation, type of operation, place of operation, persons carrying out the operation, remarks and reactions). (233)

On or about November 4, 2001, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered two people and wounded approximately forty-six in a shooting attack on a bus, which contained at l= east two United States citizens, in the French Hill area of Jerusalem, Israel. Shoshana Ben-Yishai, age sixteen, a United States citizen, was killed, and Shlomo Kaye, age fifteen, a United States citizen, was injured. = (234)

= (235)

On or about May 26, 2002, HATEM NA= JI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversat= ion with Salah Abu Hassanein in Gaza. Salah Abu Hassanein said that "Sheik Ahmad's" group (HAMAS) was taking all the donations of the organizations. HATEM NAJI FARIZ then complained t= hat prospective donors in Florida were stingier than those in Chicago even thou= gh they made good incomes; he also complained that they were suspicious about = who receives the funds. Salah Abu Hassanein quickly responded that the funds were for the poor people, and as= ked HATEM NAJI FARIZ if the amount he sent last time was $4,500.00 or $4,700.00." HATEM NAJI F= ARIZ said he wasn't sure but thought it was $4,000.00. (236)

On or about June 2, 2002, GHASSAN = ZAYED BALLUT had a telephone conversation with HATEM NAJI FARIZ during which GHAS= SAN ZAYED BALLUT discussed having seen RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH on television a= t an event and his surprise that HAMAS was not in attendance. (236.5)

On or about June 5, 2002, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered seventeen people and wound= ed approximately forty-five in a suicide car bombing of a bus in the vicinity = of Megiddo Junction near Afula, Israel. (237)

On or about June 5, 2002, GHASSAN = ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florida, had a telephone conversation = with HATEM NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT asked HATEM N= AJI FARIZ if he had heard about the attack that day near Haifa. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT said the oper= ation was successful and that twenty were killed and fifty were injured. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT then said it = was a PIJ operation. HATEM NAJI FAR= IZ said he would watch the news that night when he went home. (238)

On or about June 5, 2002, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a telephone conversation with HATEM NAJI FARIZ and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN asked HATEM NAJI FARIZ for the telephone number of another individual. After HATEM NAJI = FARIZ gave SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN the number, he asked SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN if he had h= eard the news about the suicide bombing. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and HATEM NAJI FARIZ both laughed about it. (239)

On or about June 7, 2002, HATEM NA= JI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversat= ion with GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florida, about a variety of issues, including problems at the IAF and that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN was considering resigning from the school.= HATEM NAJI FARIZ said that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOU= DEH and others had been accused of stealing money from the IAF. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT asked about t= he reaction of the community to the June 5, 2002 terrorist bombing. HATEM NAJI FARIZ said the situatio= n was bad and that the media kept connecting the "incident" to the University of South Florida, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR. HATEM = NAJI FARIZ responded that the previous incident implicated Fathi Shiqaqi and this one might implicate SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN.&nb= sp; HATEM NAJI FARIZ spoke about the attack and stated, “may God protect them,” adding that Ali Sammoudi’s first cousin was invo= lved in the bombing. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT responded that he knew about Ali Sammoudi and asked if the man who w= as involved was really his cousin. HATEM NAJI FARIZ said = yes, and that the family used to belong to another organization but later joined= the PIJ. HATEM NAJI FARIZ and GHA= SSAN ZAYED BALLUT spoke about previous transfers of money to Salah Abu Hassanein= in Gaza but that a fellow PIJ member in Gaza, Naim Nasser Bulbol, was in a desperate financial situation. GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT replied that the Elehssan Society and other org= anizations were the ones to blame because they know who their members are and they are supposed to take care of them. (240)

On or about June 7, 2002, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH caused an employee at IAF to tell an unidentified woman who was visiting the United States on a tourist visa and stated a desire to be employed at IAF that he would tell "them" to pay her in cash since she did not have papers. The IAF

(241)

On or about June 19, 2002, GHASSAN= ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florida, informed HATEM NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, during a telephone conversation, that the United States government had contacted GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT's bank and obtained his financial information and records. HATEM NAJI FARIZ asked GHASSAN ZAY= ED BALLUT if he dealt with more than one bank and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT said he= did not. (B) Later on the same day, HATEM NAJI = FARIZ notified SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN that the banking account of GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT was being examined. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN refused to discuss it on the phone and said he would stop by in th= e evening to speak with HATEM NAJI FARIZ about it.&n= bsp; (242)(A); (242)(B)

On or about July 9, 2002, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and HATEM NAJI FARIZ discussed a mutual female friend who had left town and was the subject of law enforcement inquiry. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN said he thought= the person had been planted by law enforcement and they expressed concern regar= ding the information on her computer because it had been seized by law enforcement. (242.14)

On or about July 10, 2002, HATEM N= AJI FARIZ instructed GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT not to call him at any of his numbers= and directed that GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT tell others not to call him from the mos= que or any other place, because he was concerned they were being watched. (242.21)

On or about July 17, 2002, HATEM N= AJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation with Salah Abu Hassanein and relayed his continuing concerns regarding his and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN’s mutual fem= ale friend and his belief that the FBI and CIA were on the case. HATEM NAJI FARIZ asked Salah Abu Hassanein to update Naim Nasser Bulbol.&nb= sp; (242.28)

On or about August 2, 2002, GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT and HATEM NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation and HATEM NAJI FARIZ said he had spoken = with Naim Nasser Bulbol and they discussed the death of HAMAS leader Salah Sheha= da, the effect his death would have on HAMAS, and that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH= and Shehada had a personal relationship. (242.49)

On or about August 17, 2002, SAMI = AMIN AL-ARIAN and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, who were both in the Middle District of Florida, received a facsimile from outside the State of Florida. The facsimile contained a list of = home and cell telephone numbers for several individuals overseas including a telephone number in Beirut for MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (243)

On or about August 20, 2002, HATEM= NAJI FARIZ and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT had a telephone conversation during which HA= TEM NAJI FARIZ stated that when he lived in the Middle East, he and five of his friends took a child they suspected of cooperating with the Jews to a mount= ain and assaulted him. HATEM NAJI= FARIZ also stated that he was assisting SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH with immigration matters. (243.4)

On or about August 24, 2002, HATEM= NAJI FARIZ told GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT in a telephone conversation that MAZEN AL-NAJJAR was now living with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (243.11)

On or about August 28, 2002, GHASS= AN ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florida, and HATEM NAJI FARIZ, w= ho was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversation in which HATEM NAJI FARIZ relayed instructions SAMI AMIN AL ARIAN had given him regarding the procedures they should follow in the event SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN= was arrested. (244)

On or about September 6, 2002, HAT= EM NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation with three individuals, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, and an employee of IAF. HATEM NAJI FARIZ discussed an American Muslim who had worked with Global Relief in Bridgeview, Illinois (= GRF) and was applying for a job at IAF. HATEM NAJI FARIZ stated that since this guy was involved with GRF, it was better for IAF not to consider his application so they would not arouse= the suspicions of law enforcement. HATEM NAJI FARIZ continued that the current situation was not helping and IAF was in excellent standing now and there was no need to have any questions on it as the scrutiny from the local community was enough. (246)

On or about September 7, 200= 2, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation with MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, who was in Lebanon. MAZEN AL-NAJJ= AR said he wanted to leave Lebanon and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH told him to say h= ello to MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB. (246.1)

On or about September 13, 2002, HA= TEM NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conv= ersation with GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florida. HATEM NAJI FARIZ said he had recen= tly spoken with Salah Abu Hassanein who thanked him for the money, although it = was less than last year. GHASSAN = ZAYED BALLUT said that Salah Abu Hassanein must realize that things had changed s= ince last year. HATEM NAJI FARIZ a= lso said that Salah Abu Hassanein told him that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was in= the hospital because of depression but that it was kept quiet for security reasons. They

(247)=

On September 23, 2002, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH caused an employee at IAF to discuss pay= ing three undocumented workers at the IAF.&nbs= p; The IAF employee said that he paid one of the workers in cash and further said that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had told him to pay the individuals through MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's brother in the United Arab Emirates. (248)

On or about September 24, 2002, SA= MI AMIN AL-ARIAN had a coded telephone conversation with MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB in Lebanon about the location, status and future of MAZEN AL-NAJJAR.&n= bsp; MUHAMMED TASIR HASSAN AL-KHATIB also advised SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN how = to deal with the media about MAZEN AL-NAJJAR.&n= bsp; (248.1)

On or about September 24, 2002, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR’s wife, Fedaa Al-Najjar, had a telephone conversation with HATEM NAJI FARIZ. Fedaa Al-Najjar blamed her husband= 's treatment on his Palestinian heritage.&nbs= p; HATEM NAJI FARIZ said that was true, but another reason was MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's association with terrorist organizations. He then instructed Fedaa Al-Najjar= not to not discuss this further. = HATEM NAJI FARIZ said the government is not even aware of the extent of MAZEN AL-= NAJJAR's knowledge of terrorist groups. HATEM NAJI FARIZ explained that they will continue to claim other reasons for their treatment, mainly being poor Palestinian Muslims who are occupied and expelled from their countries. (249)

On or about September 28, 2002, HA= TEM NAJI FARIZ and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT had a telephone conversation in which t= hey discussed the associations of the “Brothers” that were now operating as medical institutions and collecting medical supplies instead of donations in order to evade prohibitions on fund-raising for terrorist groups. (249.3)

On or about September 29, 2002, HA= TEM NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, made a telephone cal= l on two occasions to a facility in Syria and attempted to speak with RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. (250)<= /o:p>

On or about September 30, 2002, HA= TEM NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversation with GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT, who was outside the State of Florid= a. They discussed HATEM NAJI FARIZ's = prior unsuccessful attempts to telephone RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH. HATEM NAJI FARIZ stated that RAMAD= AN ABDULLAH SHALLAH had previously told him that it was dangerous for HATEM NA= JI FARIZ to call RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH from the United States. (251)

On or about October 12, 2002, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation with his father in which SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH informed his father that a person would be bringing $4,000 f= or distribution. (251.8)

On or about October 19, 2002, HATE= M NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation with Naim Nasser Bulbol in Gaza, and gave him a report on GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. (251.10)

On or about October 20, 2002, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered fourteen people and wounded approximately fifty in a suicide car

(252)

On or about November 8, 2002, HATE= M NAJI FARIZ and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT had a telephone conversation in which they discussed raising funds for the purchase of an ambulance. (252.14)

On or about November 9, 2002, HATE= M NAJI FARIZ sent a facsimile to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN of a proposed pledge form for donations to support the “Help the Orphans Program” sponsored by AMCN, seeking contributions for “50,000 food packages.” Shortly after sending the facsimil= e, HATEM NAJI FARIZ had a telephone conversation with SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, duri= ng which SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN told HATEM NAJI FARIZ to change the word “orphans” to “needy families” because they didnR= 17;t have 50,000 orphans in Palestine. Nevertheless, HATEM NAJI FARIZ insisted that the use of the word “orphans” was appropriate.&nbs= p; (B) Shortly after the = phone call, he sent a revised facsimile of the pledge form to SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN which changed the name of the program to “Help the Needy Families.” (252.17); (2= 52.18)

HATEM NAJI FARIZ = told GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT that SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN had told a group of donors all about AMCN and urged them to contribute to that organization. HATEM NAJI FARIZ also said he distributed the pledge forms to donors and they filled them out. HATEM NAJI FARIZ and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT spoke about arranging for SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN to conduct another AMCN fund-raising event in Chicago. HATEM NAJI FARIZ and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT then discussed the issue of AMCN not having a tax exempt number, and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT replied that = he would provide donors with such a number.&n= bsp; (252.20)

On or about November 10, 2002, HAT= EM NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversation with Salah Abu Hassanein, who was in Gaza. They discussed a variety of issues= about fund-raising and distributing money in Gaza. HATEM NAJI FARIZ said he was colle= cting funds as part of a “food packages” program. HATEM NAJI FARIZ and Salah Abu Has= sanein discussed HATEM NAJI FARIZ sending $7,000.00 to Gaza but HATEM NAJI FARIZ said that Salah A= bu Hassanein had to change the name of the organization in Gaza because the na= me “The Elehssan Society” was recognized as an organization that c= ould not receive funds from the United States.&= nbsp; They then agreed to change the name of the organization by adding the word “Birr” to “The Elehssan Society” and put that = new name on receipts that Salah Abu Hassanein would send to the United States.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> HATEM NAJI FARIZ also instructed S= alah Abu Hassanein that he could use the money however he wanted, but they neede= d to create a receipt for the donations so that HATEM NAJI FARIZ could gain the trust of the donors in the United States.&= nbsp; HATEM NAJI FARIZ said that he had begun to use an organization that = he established several years ago. Salah Abu Hassanein offered to give HATEM NAJI FARIZ the bank account number for The Elehssan Society, but HATEM NAJI FARIZ refused it and said he would transfer the money by the usual method. (B) Later that day, Salah Abu Hassanein sent a facsimile of a receipt confirming that the “ Al Birr Wal-ehssan Society” had received funds from the Tampa = Bay area. (C) On or about that same day, HATEM N= AJI FARIZ, GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN caused $7,000.00 to be transferred from AMCN through Middle East Financial Services to Salah Abu Hassanein in Gaza. (253); (25= 3.0)

They also discussed whether they s= hould retain a percentage of the donations for costs. (253.7)

On or about November 15, 2002, co-conspirators associated with the PIJ murdered twelve people and injured several others in a suicide shooting attack in the vicinity of Hebron in the West Bank. (254)

On or about December 9, 2002, HATE= M NAJI FARIZ, who was in the Middle District of Florida, had a telephone conversat= ion with a magazine reporter who was outside the State of Florida. HATEM NAJI FARIZ complained that a recent article regarding a terrorist attack in Hebron improperly failed to attribute the attack to the PIJ. HATEM NAJI FARIZ then stated that he was about to start working on h= is Ph.D. in computer engineering at the University of South Florida. (255)

On or about January 25, 2003, SAME= EH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation with his father in which SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH informed him that $1,000 had been sent through a transfer agency. His father said that = the money had not yet arrived. (B= ) Shortly thereafter, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH had a telephone conversation with HATEM NAJI FARIZ in which he informed HATEM

&= nbsp; HATEM NAJI FARIZ said that he would check with the transfer agency.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> (255.12); (255.13)

The Grand Jury realleges and incorporates by reference the acts alleged in Counts Two through Fifty-Thre= e of this Superseding Indictment as overt acts as though fully set forth herein. (256)

&= nbsp; &nbs= p; &= nbsp; &nbs= p; &= nbsp; COUNT TWO = &nb= sp; = &nb= sp; =

A. Intro= duction = Part A of Count One of the Superseding Indictment is incorporated by reference a= nd re-alleged herein.

         = Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111(a) defines the terms “murderR= 21; as it applies to acts committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as follows:

         = Title 18, United States Code, Section 114 defines the term “maiming” = as follows:

B. Agree= ment         = From in or about April, 1996, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, and continuing until the date of this Superseding Indictment, in the Middle District of Florida and elsewhere, the defendants,

SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN,

a/k/a “Amin,"

a/k/a “The Secretary,"

a= /k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH,

a/k/a “Ramadan Abdullah,"=

a/k/a “Rashad,"

a/k/a “Mohamad El-Fatih,"=

a/k/a “Mahmoud,"
a/k/a “Radwan,"

a/k/a "Al-Shaer,"
a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI,

a/k/a “Ahmed,"

C. Means= and Methods of the Conspiracy

         = It was a part and an objective of said conspiracy that the defendants and othe= rs known and unknown, would and did perform the acts listed in Part D of the Superseding Indictment, Count One, Means and Methods, which are hereby incorporated by reference.

D. Overt= Acts         = Within the jurisdiction of the United States, in furtherance of said conspiracy, a= nd to effect the objects thereof, the defendants and others, known and unknown= to the Grand Jury, committed the Overt Acts set forth in Part E of Count One, paragraphs 236 through 324 of this Superseding Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference herein.

        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       COUNT THREE

(Conspiracy to Provide Material Support)

A. Intro= duction         = Part A of Count One of the Superseding Indictment is incorporated by reference a= nd re-alleged herein.

B. Agree= ment         = From in or about 1988, the exact date being unknown to the Grand Jury, and conti= nuing to the date of this Superseding Indictment, in the Middle District of Flori= da and elsewhere subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the defenda= nts,

SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN,

a/k/a “Amin,"

a/k/a “The Secretary,"

a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH,

a/k/a “Ramadan Abdullah,"=

a/k/a “Rashad,"

a/k/a “Mohamad El-Fatih,"=

a/k/a “Mahmoud,"
a/k/a “Radwan,"

a/k/a "Al-Shaer,"
a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI,

a/k/a “Ahmed,"

        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;    C. Means and Methods of the Conspi= racy

         = To accomplish some of the purposes of the conspiracy, the defendants and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, used, among others, the following means and methods:

      The members= of the conspiracy would and did use the WISE, ICP, and IAF offices as the North American base of support for the PIJ and to raise funds and provide support= for the PIJ and their operatives in the Middle East, in order to assist its engagement in, and promotion of, violent attacks designed to thwart the Mid= dle East Peace Process.

      The members= of the conspiracy would and did work with PIJ and its leaders in coordinating = its activities with HAMAS, including the possibility of HAMAS and PIJ reconcili= ng their differences and engaging in joint terrorism operations.

       Begin= ning no later than 1988, the defendants were involved in PIJ, its financial operations and its ongoing violent efforts against the State of Israel. Operating out of the WISE, ICP and= IAF offices, co-conspirators SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR

      In their communications with each other and with other people, the defendants freque= ntly relied on code words. For ins= tance, they referred to PIJ as "the family," its operatives as "the= youth" and the "brothers," HAMAS as "the club," Fathi Shiqaqi = as "the Man," the West Bank and Gaza as "the inside" or the "the interior," and Iran, Lebanon, or Syria as "the North.&q= uot;

       Defen= dants SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI's, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA's and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's advice and assistance to PIJ and Fathi Shiqaqi w= ould and did include: (1) recommendations on financial issues that needed to be resolved by the PIJ "Shura Council;" (2) the identification of infighting within PIJ = and HAMAS and the need to resolve their differences; and (3) raising funds with= in the United States for PIJ's use and benefit.

        SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN would and did provide assistance to PIJ activists who sought = to enter and remain in the United States, including BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, giving travel and immigration advice that involved false statements and fraudulent manipulation of United States immigration laws.

&nb= sp;            =           (g)      Defendants = SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, ABD AL AZIZ AWDA, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH would and did communicate with each other, other co-defendants, and other known and unknown individua= ls to discuss the arrest of PIJ members, Fathi Shiqaqi's leadership decisions,= how PIJ and Fathi Shiqaqi were a source of funds for WISE and ICP, the particul= ar roles of the defendants within PIJ, whether HAMAS could be a source of funds for PIJ, the possibility of PIJ and HAMAS joining forces, and threats to the security of the PIJ and its members.

       At th= e WISE and ICP offices, the defendants would and did receive lists of names and ba= nk account numbers of surviving family members of PIJ "martyrs" and detainees, spoke to each other about directions they had received from Fathi Shiqaqi and about particular financial transactions. They also received and circulated facsimiles of PIJ "Military Reports," which claimed responsibility for violent attacks, threatened the State of Israel, decried the arrests of= PIJ members by the Palestinian Authority, and vowed to gut the Oslo Accords.

        The defendants' involvement in PIJ and HAMAS from 1994 forward would and did include logistical and financial assistance in terrorist activities. From the United States, the defend= ants would and did communicate with each other and with other PIJ operatives abo= ut specific PIJ and HAMAS terrorist attacks shortly after they occurred, detai= ling who committed them, who organized them, the total cost of the operations, a= nd who had been arrested. They w= ould and did raise and provide financial assistance to the surviving family memb= ers of the "martyrs" and detainees, thereby rewarding past terrorist = acts and providing incentive for future terrorist acts.

        On or about January 23, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12947, which declared a national state of emergency, designated certain organizations and individuals as threats to the Middle East Process and Specially Designated Terrorists, and barred all financial transactions with them. Among the groups/individuals desig= nated as Specially Designated Terrorists were HAMAS, PIJ, Fathi Shiqaqi and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA. As a result, it be= came illegal for persons within the United States to engage in financial transactions wi= th these designated terrorists and terrorist groups.

       Defen= dant RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH received a facsimile of a document describing Executive Order 12947 on January 25, 1995.= On or about February 6, 1995, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN engaged in a teleph= one discussion during which he discussed the Executive Order and stated that it applied to people such as Fathi Shiqaqi, and operations outside the United States.

        Notwithstanding this prohibition and the defendants' awareness of it, the defendants would = and did continue to provide services and support to PIJ, Fathi Shiqaqi, ABD AL = AZIZ AWDA and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, and would and did continue to receive and send communications about Palestinian terrorism. During the spring of 1995, the defendants received facsimiles of articles glorifying attacks that claimed = the lives of innocent people and demanding the release of HAMAS and PIJ terrori= sts being held in Palestinian prisons; they advised Fathi Shiqaqi and others ab= out how to engage in effective propaganda while avoiding the scrutiny of United States and European law enforcement; and they communicated with persons in = Iran and Syria about the possibility of procuring encrypted communications equip= ment to facilitate information sharing. They also continued to discuss PIJ recruitment, the interrelationship between PIJ and HAMAS and the possibility of joining forces.

     From early 1995 forward, in the face of increasing public scrutiny, the defendants and co-conspirators would and did rally around SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, RAMADAN ABDU= LLAH SHALLAH, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI and MAZEN AL-NAJJAR to protect their identity as high-ranking members of PIJ and to protect the PIJ operation at WISE and ICP. To accomplish t= his, they utilized codes and veiled communications, and expressed the need to be security conscious when speaking by phone.= They also stated their concerns with being discovered by United Stat= es law enforcement. The defendan= t SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN continued to be involved in PIJ financial matters, although R= AMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and Fathi Shiqaqi discussed certain problems caused by SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's public statements and the need for him to be more circumspect. Operating out of= the WISE/ICP offices, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH continued the defendants' promin= ent role in PIJ

       On Oc= tober 26, 1995, Fathi Shiqaqi was killed in Malta. Shortly thereafter, defendant RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, who had recently left his employment at WISE in Tampa and moved to Damascus, Syria, succeeded Fathi Shiqaqi as the Secretary General = of PIJ. On November 27, 1995, RA= MADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was designated by the United States as a Specially Designa= ted Terrorist under Executive Order 12947.

       In the aftermath of Fathi Shiqaqi's death and RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's ascension= to Secretary General of PIJ, the defendant SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, in an effort to conceal his affiliation with PIJ, falsely denied that he was aware of RAMAD= AN ABDULLAH SHALLAH's association with, or activities on behalf of, PIJ while RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was employed by WISE and ICP. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN further falsely stated that he only knew RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH as “Ramadan Abdullah” and that RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH was only engaged as a legitimate scholar while working at WISE and ICP.

      As a result= of the negative publicity surrounding WISE, the defendant SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN reorganized the manner in which the defendants interacted with PIJ and RAMA= DAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH, although they did not cease their activities, including t= heir logistical support for terrorism. The defendants would and did continue to communicate using coded language and veiled communications and explicitly referred to their need to= be careful when communicating with one another.

      Throughout = the remainder of the 1990's to the present, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, HATEM NAJI FARIZ, GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI and others would and did continue to engage in PIJ fund-raising and support activities in a calculated manner to conceal the nature of what they were d= oing and the source and recipients of the support. This fund-raising was done to furt= her the goals of the PIJ in a manner designed to influence or affect the conduc= t of the Israeli and United States governments by intimidation or coercion, and = to retaliate against government conduct.

        On or about October 7, 1997, the Secretary of State, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and Section 219 of the Immigration= and Nationality Act, designated PIJ and HAMAS as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." As a res= ult of this designation, it became illegal for any person within the United States= or subject to its jurisdiction to provide material support or resources to PIJ= and HAMAS.

        Notwithstanding this third announced legal prohibition against providing assistance to designated terrorist organizations and individuals, the defendants would and did continue their activities in support of PIJ. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN continued in hi= s role as an advisor to PIJ, editing a Charter of the PIJ in 2000 and forwarding i= t to others. Following this design= ation, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN and others would and did continue with fund-raising activities and their efforts to conceal what they were doing.

Defendant SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH be= gan to take on public appearance and fund-raising responsibilities on SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN's behalf. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN gave specific instructions to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH on what meetin= gs to attend and where to travel, and provided him money for this purpose.

       Durin= g this period, in an effort to take away attention from himself, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN increasingly relied on SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH, HATEM NAJI FARIZ and GHASSAN ZAYED BALLUT and others to continue the fund-raising activity he had conduc= ted himself in the past. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN also relied on other members of the conspiracy to carry out the logistical efforts necessary to transfer PIJ funds in and out of the United States. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN instructed the other co-conspirators to transfer funds overseas in the name= s of individuals, not organizations, in order to avoid detection by law enforcem= ent.

From in or about August through Oc= tober 2000, BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN made false and misleading statements and caused to be submitted false and mislea= ding documents during the course of MAZEN AL-NAJJAR's immigration proceedings in order to conceal his and their association with the PIJ. SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, BASHIR MUSA MO= HAMMED NAFI and SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH also conspired to submit a misleading statem= ent from ABD AL AZIZ AWDA for purposes of these immigration proceedings. The co-conspirators also raised fu= nds to provide financial assistance to MAZEN AL-NAJJAR in his effort to mislead the court about his affiliation with the PIJ, thereby conspiring to provide material support to the PIJ.

Beginning no later than December 2= 001 and continuing into January 2003, in order to provide their fund-raising efforts for the PIJ with a cloak of legitimacy and conceal their ongoing relationship with the PIJ, defendants HATEM NAJI FARIZ, GHASSAN ZAYED BALLU= T, and SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN utilized the AMCN as a front to raise and transfer f= unds to the PIJ overseas.

Beginning in the late 1990s, SAMEE= H TAHA HAMMOUDEH utilized various methods to transfer funds from the United States= to the Territories in order to evade detection by law enforcement. Such methods included, but were not limited to: (a) sending cash;= (b) sending funds via courier; (c) sending funds via a money changer; (d) sendi= ng funds via the “hawalla” method; (e) sending funds to individuals for further distribution to organizations and other individuals; and (f) sending funds using a combination of the above-described methods.

        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       D. Overt Acts

         = In furtherance of said conspiracy, and to effect the purposes thereof, the defendants and others known and unknown to the Grand jury, committed the ov= ert acts set forth in Part E of Count One, paragraphs 242 through 324 of this Superseding Indictment, which are fully incorporated by reference herein.

        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       COUNT FOUR

            =     (Conspiracy to Make and Receive Contributions of Funds, Goods,

            =       or Services to or for the Benefit of Specially Designated Terrorists)

            =             &nb= sp;            =             &nb= sp;            = A. Introduction=

         = Part A of Count One of the Superseding Indictment is incorporated by reference a= nd realleged herein.

         = The President of the United States, by virtue of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA") (Title 50, United States Code, Sect= ion 1701 et seq.), was empowered to deal with unusual or extraordinary threats to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The President dealt with unusual or extraordinary threats through Executive Orders which had the force and effe= ct of law. A violation of an Exe= cutive Order was a criminal act.

         = On or about January 23, 1995, under the authority of IEEPA, the President issu= ed Executive Order 12947, which declared a national emergency regarding the gr= ave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupted the Middle = East Peace Process. The Executive = Order prohibited transactions, including financial transactions, with organizatio= ns and individuals who threatened to disrupt the Middle East Peace Process and= who were declared to be a Specially Designated Terrorist by the United States Department of Treasury. Specifically, the Executive Order prohibited "any transaction or dealing by United States persons or with the United States in property or interests in property of the persons designated in, or pursuant to" the Order, "including the making or receiving or any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of such persons." The Executive Order also prohibite= d any transaction by any United States person or within the United States that ev= ades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violat= e, any of the prohibitions set forth in the Order.

         = The national emergency under which the foregoing Executive Order was issued has been continuously in force since 1995.

         = Executive Order 12947 defined "United States person" specifically to include "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien . . . or any pers= on in the United States."

         = To implement Executive Order 12947, the United States Department of Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control, promulgated the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 595). Effective January 25, 1995, these regulations prohibit, among other things:

      dealing in = the property or interests in property of a Specially Designated Terrorist, incl= uding the making or receiving of any contributions of funds, goods, services to or for the benefit of a Specially Designated Terrorist;

      making a "charitable contribution or donation of funds, goods, services, or technology" to or for the benefit of a Specially Designated Terrorist;=

       any transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding, or which facilitates the evasion or avoidance of, the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations; and

      any conspir= acy formed for the purpose of engaging in a prohibited transaction.<= /span>

         = On or about January 25, 1995, pursuant to Executive Order 12947, the Departmen= t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, designated the Palestinian Isla= mic Jihad as a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization, and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA and Fathi Shiqaqi as Specially Designated Terrorists.

         = On November 27, 1995, pursuant to Executive Order 12947, the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, designated RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHA= LLAH as a Specially Designated Terrorist.

        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp; B. The Agreement

         = From a date unknown to the Grand Jury, but not later than January 25, 1995, and continuing to the date of this Superseding Indictment, in the Middle Distri= ct of Florida and elsewhere, the defendants,

SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN,

a/k/a “Amin,"

a/k/a “The Secretary,"

a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,”

RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH,

a/k/a “Ramadan Abdullah,"=

a/k/a “Rashad,"

a/k/a “Mohamad El-Fatih,"=

a/k/a “Mahmoud,"
a/k/a “Radwan,"

a/k/a "Al-Shaer,"